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EMOTIONAL JUSTICE: MORALIZING THE
PASSIONS OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
Samuel H. Pillsburyt
Justice and injustice in criminal adjudication are more than ab-
stract concepts; in modem America each term conjures up its own
paradigm image. Justice occurs in a somber courtroom where a
robed judge, sworn jurors and informed counsel calmly and deliber-
ately apply their highest powers of reason to reach a legal decision.
Injustice is a blood-thirsty mob bearing lit torches, pounding on the
doors of the jail, desperate to wreak bodily revenge upon the sus-
pected wrongdoer held within.1
This image of injustice provides many normative insights. One
which courts have frequently drawn is that in criminal adjudication
Emotion is unalterably opposed to Reason and thus to Justice itself.
Taking this principle a step farther, courts have urged that the more
a legal issue might provoke popular rage, that hallmark of the lynch
mob, the harder courts must work to insulate the legal decision from
emotive influence. The classic example is capital sentencing, a mat-
ter which evokes strong emotions. Here the Supreme Court has
worked to ensure that "any decision to impose the death sentence
be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emo-
tion."2 The Court has, over a period of years, undertaken an exten-
sive regulatory project aimed at suppressing emotive influence in
capital cases by mandating rationalistic rules to guide sentencing.
This insistence upon the injustice of all emotion stems from a
misconception of emotion and its influence upon criminal punish-
t Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, A.B. 1976 Harvard
College; J.D. 1983 University of Southern California Law Center.
I would like to thank Stephen Morse and Donald Brosnan for their critical readings
of various drafts of this paper, my colleagues at Loyola Law School for their comments
at a faculty forum to which an earlier draft was presented, and finally my wife Linda,
whose editorial and other assistance was, as always, invaluable.
I E.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing
risks of earlier town meeting form of adjudication: "that it might become a gathering
moved by emotions or passions growing from the nature of a crime; a 'lynch mob' ambi-
ence is hardly conducive to calm, reasoned decision-making .... ); Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (emphasizing the need for "solemnity and sobriety" in an
adjudicatory "system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a
mob."); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (arguing trials dominated by mobs
"deprive the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law").
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (Stewart,J., concurring) (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
655
CORNELL L4 W REVIEW
ment. Although the mob-at-the-jail scene illustrates that anger can
lead to injustice, it does not support the proposition that all deci-
sions influenced by anger are morally tainted. Anger can be justi-
fied and have moral content, as can many other emotions. The
relationship between emotion and moral decisionmaking is com-
plex; untangling it involves a closer examination of emotion than
the law has generally undertaken.
My subject is the influence of emotions on sentencing under a
retributive theory of punishment. When punishment is based on re-
tributive principles, what are the moral risks presented by emotive
influence and how may they be minimized? The context for this dis-
cussion is capital punishment, where the problems of emotive influ-
ence are most acute. My discussion of this problem rests on two
basic theoretical assumptions: one concerning the justification of
punishment and the other concerning the nature of emotion. I
adopt rather than justify a Kantian theory of retributive punishment
and a cognitive theory of emotion. Both represent the predominant
theoretical explanations in their respective fields. I do not under-
take their justification because that would require a work considera-
bly longer than what follows, and what follows is quite long enough.
It would also be beside the point. My main concern is the practical
application of these theoretical constructs. My argument comprises
the following basic propositions:
(1) that punishment is justified when and to the extent it is
deserved for responsible wrong-doing;
(2) that this view of punishment flows from the general obli-
gation to respect persons as autonomous moral beings, that is, the
principle of respect for persons;
(3) that accuracy in determining what punishment is de-
served is all-important in the capital context and determinate
rules cannot capture the complexities of this evaluation; there-
fore, sentencers must have considerable discretion in rendering
life or death decisions;
(4) that given discretion, sentencers will inevitably respond,
consciously or unconsciously, to a range of emotions in their de-
termination of what punishment is deserved;
(5) that some of the emotions commonly implicated in deci-
sions of deserved punishment encourage moral decisionmaking
and others do not;
(6) that emotions involve cognitive assessments and possess
their own form of rationality;
(7) that emotions and their influence may be controlled by
deliberative rationality;
(8) that respect for persons should be reconceptualized in
656 [Vol. 74:655
EMOTIONAL JUSTICE
moral-emotive terms as a requirement that we care about persons
for their moral capacities and actions;
(9) that the determination of deserved punishment should
be reconceived as a moral-emotive dynamic involving outrage at
the offender's acts of disrespect (moral outrage); and caring for
the offender's positive moral qualities (empathy); and
(10) that courts should ensure that sentencers have the op-
portunity to hear evidence relevant to moral outrage and empa-
thy, should advise sentencers of the legitimacy of both, and, to
ensure that sentencer outrage remains moral, should advise
sentencers of the need to empathize with the offender as a person.
Section I sets out a retributive theory of punishment. Based
upon the Kantian principle of respect for persons, retribution in-
volves a broad-scale evaluation of offense and offender. I then turn
to the problem of emotive influence as it has been traditionally con-
ceived by courts. I review the law's predominant strategy of at-
tempting to suppress emotional influence through rules and
depersonalized procedures, and point out the inadequacy of this ap-
proach in criminal sentencing. Finally, by examining the varieties of
emotive influence, I show that not all emotional influence is danger-
ous and that the law's task must be to separate those emotional in-
fluences which are moral from those which are amoral or immoral.
Section II concerns the nature of emotion and our responsibil-
ity for it. Drawing on recent philosophic and psychological work on
emotion, I set out a cognitive theory of emotion which posits that
cognitive assessment is critical to emotion. Emotion represents a
sensory experience arising out of a cognitive assessment of an event,
person or situation, usually accompanied by a desire for action of a
particular kind. The cognitive assessment upon which the emotion
is based may be conscious or unconscious, mistaken or accurate, ap-
propriate or inappropriate, but in all events constitutes an attempt
to assess a situation by means which have their own internal ration-
ality. Although emotions often resist deliberative influence, they are
subject to rational control and we can be held responsible for them.
In Section III, I formulate a moral-emotive theory of retribu-
tion. I employ the Biblical concept of agape, a love for others based
on their worth as persons, as an emotive counterpart to respect for
persons and propose a moral-emotive principle called moral caring
which values, and evaluates, the offender's exercise of morality.
Moral caring constitutes an emotional dynamic for determining just
punishment. It consists of moral outrage-anger at the offender's
responsible disrespect for others-and empathy, caring for the of-
fender's positive moral character. I examine the emotional tempta-
tions to decide punishment on amoral bases and conclude that the
only cure for these is to require that, along with outrage for the
1989] 657
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offender's evil choice, sentencers attempt to empathize with the
offender.
Section IV concerns the application of moral-emotive precepts
to capital punishment. The Supreme Court has made significant ef-
forts to protect the opportunity to empathize in its capital jurispru-
dence, but has failed to see the need to affirmatively encourage
sentencer empathy. I suggest several means of such encourage-
ment, centering on jury instructions. Finally, in the context of a par-
ticular failure of empathy-the influence of racial bias upon
sentencing-I note the limitations of moral-emotive principles in
terms of standards for decisional review.
I
RETRIBUTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EMOTIVE INFLUENCE
In order to determine the moral impact of emotion on punish-
ment, we need a moral theory of punishment. The moral theory
upon which this Article is based is a Kantian view of retribution.
While controversial (like all punishment theories), it has enjoyed
wide scholarly acceptance in recent writings on punishment.3 I will
not attempt a justification of the theory; instead, following a brief
theoretical explication, I employ retributive theory to analyze how
emotional reactions affect the moral decision that a particular pun-
ishment is justified. I then undertake a critical analysis of the law's
traditional opposition of reason and emotion.
The selection of a retributive theory of punishment has the
benefit of permitting analysis largely congruent with that of the
Supreme Court in the context of capital punishment, where the
problem of emotional influence arises most dramatically. While the
Court has carefully avoided constitutionalizing a theory of punish-
ment in its decisions on cruel and unusual punishments under the
eighth amendment, the Court has, by its rhetoric and decisions
demonstrated the preeminence of retributive justifications in its vi-
sion of what that constitutional prohibition means.4 This precedent
neither justifies the retributive theory generally, nor validates the
specific view of it I set out, but it does mean that in the capital con-
text, my definition of justice is largely consistent with that of the
3 See Cederblom, Introduction to JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT I (I. Cederbiom & W.
Blizek eds. 1977); G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416 (1978); Gardner, The
Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of DoingJustice, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 781, 781. See,
e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976);J. KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973);
R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS (1979); MABBOT, Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON PUNISHMENT 165 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
4 See infra notes 9 and 13.
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Court. Our main differences lie in how to translate the aims of retri-
bution into practice.
A. Retribution
Retributive punishment is the deliberate, official infliction of
pain on an offender based on an assessment of the offender's moral
responsibility for committing the offense. The theory holds that
punishment is justified when it is deserved. 5 Although retribution
represents a deontological justification of punishment based on
moral responsibility, it does not represent a first-order moral princi-
ple. Rather it derives from a more fundamental principle of moral
conduct which dictates how persons should be treated generally, a
principle known as respect for persons.
1. Respect for Persons
What is it about people that we must treat them well? What is it
about persons, irrespective of their actions, that we must care
about? Why don't we regard people like insects, encouraging those
who benefit us and exterminating those who annoy us? The answer
to this question is important, for if we know why we have a general
obligation to treat persons well, we may also learn how it is we can
treat them badly in the form of punishment. Respect for persons
provides an answer.
The classical description of respect for persons comes from the
work of Immanuel Kant.6 Persons, Kant held, are ends in them-
5 For general treatments of the theory, see H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BILrrY (1968);J. KLEINIG, supra note 3; C. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT (1987);
Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179-219 (1987) in
RESPONSIBILITY (F. Schoeman ed.) (forthcoming).
6 See generally I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (T.
Abbott trans. 1987) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES]; Doctrine of Virtue, Pt. II of I.
KANT, THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 131-40 (M. Gregory trans. 1964) [hereinafter Doctrine
of Virtue). Modem writers have applied their versions of the respect for persons theory
to the eighth amendment, Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process
for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980); Note, Creatures, Persons and Prisoners: Evaluating
Prison Conditions Under the Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1982); due process,
Michelman, Furman and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 126 (J.
Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1977); privacy, Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons,
in PRIVACY 1 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1971); equal protection, Karst, Foreward to
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Michelman,
Foreward to On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969); the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, Dolinko, Is There A Rationale
For the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1137-47 (1986) (re-
viewing theories based on individual autonomy and personhood); and the first amend-
ment, Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978).
Interestingly, one Kantian scholar has recently suggested that although Kant's works
provide essential clues for any justice, rights and desert-based punishment philosophy,
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selves and may not be used merely as means to other ends.7 By this
he meant that human individuals are not merely useful for certain
purposes, but are valuable for themselves.8 His principle of respect
entails a moral regard for persons based on the qualities which make
them valuable. Kant held that the fundamental value of mankind
lies in two human capacities: the rational will, the ability to reason
and choose based upon reason, and the autonomy of the will, the
ability to create and obey rules. Together they comprise the per-
son's ability to make moral choices. Society must always respect
these capacities, which are inherent in the human condition. Even
the immoral person has a worth which must be valued. 9
Kant himself did not have a coherent punishment philosophy. Murphy, Does Kant Have A
Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1987).
7 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 56-58; I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965); Doctrine of Virtue, supra note 6, at 131-40.
8 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 58-59; see R. DOWNIE & E. TELFER,
RESPECT FOR PERSONS 14-15 (1970).
9 I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 131-32; Doc-
trine of Virtue, supra note 6, at 132-34.
In their eighth amendment jurisprudence justices on the Supreme Court have fol-
lowed respect for persons' principles. Justices have cited a fundamental worth in indi-
vidual human existence, which they call "humanity" or "human dignity," and have held
that courts must respect this worth in punishment. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), Chief Justice Warren stated that the basic concept of the eighth amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is the "dignity of man." Id. at 100 (plural-
ity opinion). See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (reference to "the
fundamental human dignity" that the eighth amendment protects). The Court has with
some consistency protected the "uniqueness of the individual" in eighth amendment
decisions, a value which appears consistent with the concept of human dignity. See Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Kant also
described the value of persons in terms of their dignity. See FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
supra note 6, at 64-65. A further set of clues to the Court's vision of human worth lies in
its historical view of cruel punishments. The Court has used certain past penal prac-
tices, particularly torture and severe corporal punishment, as paradigms of "barbarous"
punishments. The Court sees in the historic rejection of these penalties evidence of a
moral basis for the amendment. They provide a benchmark of cruelty from which we
may measure "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety." Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. Thus, Justices have argued, the meaning of cruel punish-
ment today has something to do with the reason that we do not torture suspects, burn
offenders at the stake, crucify or break them on the wheel, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S.
323, 363 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting), nor brand them, crop their ears, or nail them to
the pillory. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 430 (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Murphy, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in REr-
RIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 223-33 (1979).
Consistent with this paradigm is the Court's recurring condemnation of deliberate
infliction of physical pain as punishment. E.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)
(eighth amendment prohibits torture and torturous punishments); In re Kimmler, 136
U.S. 436, 447 (1880) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death."); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 364 (1892) (Field,J., dissenting) ("A convict
is not to be scourged until the flesh fall from his body and he die under the lash though
he may have committed a hundred offenses .... "); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910) (violation of eighth amendment to punish offense of fraudulently altering an
660 [Vol. 74:655
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Respect for persons is a first-order principle of moral treat-
ment, setting a minimal code of conduct for human beings in all
contexts. Respect for persons prohibits torturous punishments,
even for the most heinous offenders, because such punishment
reduces the punished to animal status, capable of physical sensation
but not rational moral choice.10
2. Deserved Punishment and Sentencing
Kant's respect principle not only sets a standard for the minimal
treatment of persons; within that framework it also provides a
means for their evaluation. Because we value persons for their ca-
pacity to make moral choices, it follows that we should judge them
(value them) according to their exercise of that capacity.'1  Society's
right to punish a wrongdoer is based on the wrongdoer's ability to
choose between right and wrong. We punish in order to demon-
strate the offender's responsibility for making a bad moral choice.'
2
As a person, the offender could recognize the difference between
good and evil, yet choose evil over good. Punishment signifies our
condemnation of that freely made, but morally wrong, choice.
13
official document by fifteen years hard labor in chains); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (alluding to
"physical mistreatment" and "primitive torture"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
346 (1981) (eighth amendment prohibits punishments which "involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain," quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
This rejection of torture and severe corporal punishment on moral grounds may have its
roots in the respect for persons principle. Torture is morally offensive because it repre-
sents the use of external force to destroy the offender's ability to think and communicate
independently. Under the pressure of torture, a person is no longer a free-willed actor,
responsible for his or her actions, but becomes a tool of the torturer, an experimental
animal manipulated by the inflicter of pain and source of relief. Severe corporal punish-
ment demonstrates a similar attitude toward its victim because it assumes that the of-
fender is animalistic, sensitive only to physical pain. The punishment is designed to
beat, by force, the inclination to offend out of the offender. The punishment ignores the
rational capacities of the offender in favor of the sensual capacities.
Overall, the Court's rhetoric of dignity and uniqueness and its view of torture and
severe corporal punishment suggest that the Court's concept of cruel punishment rests
upon a notion that all humans possess a fundamental worth based on the capacity to
reason and freely choose. This notion is consistent with the respect for persons
principle.
10 Murphy, supra note 9, at 233-34.
11 Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 580;
583 (1987).
12 Morris, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31-58 (1976).
13 The Supreme Court's eighth amendmentjurisprudence emphasizes a similar, re-
tributive view of punishment. The Court has held that in order for the death penalty to
be justified the defendant must deserve the penalty. Deterrence may play an important
role, but it can not substitute for lack of desert. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
461-62 (1984) (retribution more important than other punishmentjustifications in death
penalty sentencing; incapacitation a relevant factor, but alone is not a sufficient justifica-
tion); id. at 480-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (justification of particular death sentence
depends on retribution-a judgment of defendant's moral guilt). A number of the
Court's holdings support the preeminence of retribution in the death penalty. For ex-
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To say that a punishment is deserved means more than that an
offender was responsible for a crime and should be punished; it also
means that the punishment matches the crime. For both liability
and sentence, three basic components comprise the judgment of de-
served punishment: harm, motive-intentionality and autonomy.
First is an objective assessment of the harm done by the offender.
For serious crimes this constitutes the extent of disrespect suffered
by the victim of the offense and by society generally. For example, a
rapist deprives the victim of bodily integrity and sexual choice, thus
fundamentally disrespecting the victim's autonomy. The focus here
is on the harm suffered, not what the offender had in mind in caus-
ing the suffering. The remainder of the culpability evaluation fo-
cuses on the offender's subjective decision to commit the offense.
Motive-intentionality examines only the conscious why of the
offense. What was the offender's immediate purpose in his criminal
act; what motivated him to act with such purpose? Motive-inten-
tionality distinguishes liability for a premeditated killing from a
spontaneous one on the basis of the offender's decision process.
For sentencing purposes, motive-intentionality distinguishes a con-
tract killing from a mercy killing, both of which may comprise the
same legal offense. The contract killer acted with complete disre-
gard for the respect principle; the mercy killer's act was consistent
with at least some notion of respect for persons.
Autonomy measures the individual's capacity to make an in-
dependent moral choice. Its evaluation involves the tension be-
tween innate autonomy and those forces operating on the person
which disrupt the normal reasoning or functioning process. The
paradigm example of autonomy evaluation is the determination of
ample, in Coker v. Georgia the defendant was highly dangerous-he had committed two
previous murders and after a year in prison, escaped and immediately committed a rob-
bery and rape. Yet such dangerousness was not sufficient to justify his execution. 433
U.S. 584, 604-22 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). In Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct.
2716 (1987), the Court held that a state may not make death mandatory for a murder
committed by a prison inmate under sentence of life imprisonment, rejecting the state's
deterrent arguments. Id. at 2726. The Court has held that decisions to execute focus
fundamentally on the blameworthiness of the offender in the harm caused. Booth v.
Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2534-35 (1987). In evaluating death penalties for offenders
who did not personally kill, the Court has concentrated on the defendant's personal
culpability in the killing. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987) (death penalty for
accomplices to murder who were indifferent to great risk of death does not violate
eighth amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (violation of eighth
amendment to execute accomplice to robbery murder who lacked intent to kill). The
Court has found that punishment is rooted in individual moral responsibility and that no
person who has become morally irresponsible by virtue of insanity may be executed.
Ford. v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986). The Court has found mandatory death
statutes unconstitutional because they do not sufficiently distinguish between the vary-
ing culpability of offenders. E.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2724-2725
(1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977).
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whether (or how much) mental disease or defect created an irra-
tional thought process concerning the offense or compelling its
commission.
For a particular sentence to be deserved it must be proportional
to the seriousness of the crime. Initially, the legislature must rank
offense categories according to relative seriousness. Within this leg-
islative ranking the sentencer must then rank particular instances of
the same category of offense. Some first-degree murders are worse
than others. Finally, the sentencer must match the ranking of of-
fense severity with an equivalent ranking of punishment severity. 14
The most serious crimes should receive the most severe punish-
ments, and so on.
Evaluation of the seriousness of a particular crime requires an
evaluation of the individual offender. The offender deserves a par-
ticular punishment not simply for an act which causes harm but ac-
cording to his personal responsibility for committing the act. 15 This
evaluation necessarily includes a review of the broad array of forces
operating upon the individual to ascertain the extent of the individ-
ual's responsibility. Both critics and proponents of retribution have
long noted the difficulty of this individual culpability evaluation. 16
At the liability stage, rough categorization may reduce the complex-
ity of the task. Given the essentially binary responsibility question,
we can separate all potential limitations on responsibility into two
categories: sufficient and insufficient.17 At sentencing, however, the
greater gradation of sentences means that we must also rank each
instance of an offense. In deciding whether the sentence should be
ten years or twenty, life or death, all variables must be measured.
Within a retributive penal system, concerns about system-wide
accuracy may argue for a limitation on individualistic assessment of
culpability at sentencing."' We may decide that, overall, there will
be fewer mistakes in desert assessment under a mandatory sentenc-
ing scheme, so that we can tolerate those few errors which result
from the scheme's rigidity. This assumes that the consequences of
14 SeeJ. KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 110-28; Pincoffs, Are Questions of Desert Decidable?, in
JUSTIcE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 75-88.
15 See, e.g., J. KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 50-55; Gardner, supra note 3, at 804-05.
16 See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 5, at 161-63; M. MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT
32-33 (1981); Bedau, Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, inJUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT,
supra note 3, at 63-64. Cf J. KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 110-14, 127-28; Pincoffs, supra note
14, at 75-88; Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
379, 400-01 (1978); Murphy, supra note 6, at 513-15 (quoting I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON, IN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES and I. KANT, RELIGION WITHIN LIMITS OF REASON
ALONE).
17 For a good overview, see Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1091
(1985).
18 See R. SINGER, supra note 3, at 22-29.
1989] 663
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
an individual mistake will be tolerable. Where the paramount value
in desert evaluation is accuracy, however, there can be no shortcuts
in evaluating deserved punishment. Under these circumstances the
principle of deserved punishment makes relevant virtually novelistic
detail concerning the offender and offense. Anything which might
tend to create irrationality or compel a particular act is relevant.
Anything which points in the opposite direction, which indicates
unimpaired, uncompelled choice, is relevant as well. We may distin-
guish between proffered "excuses," such as mental disease and alco-
holism in the extent to which they affect culpability. We can argue
about their relative impact on intentionality and autonomy and the
fault the offender bears in their origin. We cannot exclude them
from consideration, however. Even if alcoholism is an aggravating
factor, making the offender more responsible, it is relevant. Where
the accurate determination of desert is all-important, assessing the
amount of punishment deserved will involve an inquiry of great
breadth.
B. Retribution and The Problem of Emotive Influence
Having defined deserved punishment, we turn now to its rela-
tionship with common emotional reactions concerning punishment.
Courts and commentators have traditionally viewed the assessment
of deserved punishment as a dispassionate, deliberative judgment,
untouched by emotion. In practice, however, the issue of punish-
ment provokes a variety of emotions which frequently influence the
penal decision. Recognizing the potential for unjust, emotional de-
cisions, courts and commentators have urged the suppression of all
emotion in sentencing. This strategy is based on a misunderstand-
ing of the problem of emotive influence, a problem most starkly
presented in capital sentencing.
1. The Problem Illustrated
Imagine the following two capital cases:
A murder takes place in a small, tightly-knit community. A
young man, a stranger to the community, kidnaps, rapes, tortures
and kills a woman librarian. He is quickly apprehended and charged
with a capital offense. At trial he is convicted on overwhelming evi-
dence. At the sentencing hearing the defendant expresses remorse
and tells of being physically abused by his alcoholic father as a child
growing up in a distant city. A social worker from the city tells the
jury of the defendant's efforts to help other abused children. The
state presents evidence of two prior sexual assaults by the defend-
ant, each committed with great brutality. The judge instructs the
jury that the decision between life and death is up to them.
664 [Vol. 74:655
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The community is horror-struck by the crime and deeply an-
gered by it. The residents feel personally violated by the evil perpe-
trated by the young man from the city. Those on the jury are part of
the community and they also experience these feelings. They dis-
cuss their feelings about the case, the defendant's good points and
bad points, but return always to the stark evil of the crime. The jury
sentences the defendant to die.
Imagine the same crime in the same community committed by
the same defendant, with one important difference in background-
the defendant is not a stranger to the community but has lived there
most of his life. Most in the community knew defendant's father, a
drunken, vicious man. Instead of a social worker from the city, the
head of the local orphanage where defendant spent his adolescence
testifies about defendant's efforts to help young orphans. The state
introduces the same evidence on the defendant's prior offenses-
these occurred while defendant lived elsewhere. The court's in-
structions are the same and the jury deliberates along similar lines.
Except that the jurors somehow feel differently about the offender;
his face has an emotional pull on them which makes them come back
again and again to his remorse and the pleas of community mem-
bers on his behalf. The jury sentences the defendant to life in
prison.
These cases, while fictional, illustrate a fundamental problem
for the law of punishment: how can we ensure that penal judgments
are based on moral reasons and not morally irrelevant, or even im-
moral, "feelings?" Under a retributive system of punishment both
defendants deserve equal punishment. The factor that made the
difference-where the defendant lived-is not morally relevant.
The law must devise a way to minimize this kind of moral error.
2. The Myth of Dispassion
The law has its own culture and its own preferred means of dis-
course. The predominant culture of the law promotes formal, delib-
erative, and dispassionate decisionmaking. Its modern ideal is a
complete rationalistic rule structure which determines results in an
objective, i.e., impersonal, fashion. Legal adjudication centers
around proceedings of religious solemnity according to principles
of scriptural authority. 19 The culture of modern law discourages in-
formal, intuitive, personal, or passionate decisionmaking. 20 From
19 E.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). See also cases cited supra notes
I & 9.
20 See cases cited supra note 1; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940)
(due process requires "a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement.. ."). See
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this basic antipathy to personal and emotional approaches to law
grows the myth of dispassion.
Because courts view the law as fundamentally dispassionate and
competing adjudicative processes such as the lynch mob as highly
emotional, courts have often concluded that lack of emotion is an
essential attribute ofjustice.21 I call this the myth of dispassion be-
cause it rests upon two fictions: (1) that emotion necessarily leads to
injustice, and (2) that a just decisionmaker is necessarily a dispas-
sionate one.
In some contexts, courts have recognized the moral relevance
of certain emotional reactions. 22 This remains very much the excep-
tion, however. More commonly, the law's cultural bias against emo-
tion has persuaded courts of the need to suppress all emotional
influence on legal decisionmaking.
C. Strategies for Emotive Suppression-Depersonalization
Many aspects of modem criminal adjudication indicate a con-
scious strategy of depersonalizing adjudication in order to suppress
the influence of emotions. As I discuss at greater length below,23
emotions constitute a way of personalizing external situations. They
bring home to the self what is happening outside it. Modem crimi-
nal justice functions to depersonalize the controversy for the deci-
sionmaker. In contrast to earlier forms of adjudication, which
featured direct confrontations between the parties,24 modern law
goes to great lengths to depersonalize the confrontation through
the use of legal intermediaries who play carefully defined formal,
adversarial roles. Lawyers, with only their professional pride at
stake, act out the conflict. Likewise the decisionmakers-lawyers
transformed into judges and citizens transformed into jurors-take
their appointed positions and play formal roles that allow them, in
theory at least, to detach their emotional selves from the proceed-
ings. From this detached stance the decisionmakers may (theoreti-
cally) judge, not according to personal, subjective and emotional
standards, but according to objective, collectively-resolved, rational
principles. 2
5
generallyJ. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964);J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 3-15
(1976).
21 See cases cited supra notes 1, 9.
22 See, e.g., infra note 44 and accompanying text.
23 See infra Section II.
24 The early English criminal trial was a relatively informal process necessarily in-
volving a citizen accuser and a defendant who appeared without counsel. Jurors could
act as both judges and witnesses. See L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FiFTH AMENDMENT 19-32
(1968); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 244-72 (1883).
25 The formality of the courtroom setting encourages the expression of public val-
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Reliance upon rationalistic rules also works to depersonalize
adjudication. Resort to universal, rationalistic rules leaves little
room for idiosyncratic approaches to decisionmaking. Modern
criminal trials, because of expanded procedural regulation and sub-
stantive sophistication, increasingly have become legal as opposed
to personal dramas.
In capital cases the Supreme Court has sought to depersonalize
adjudication by encouraging a new legal production, the trial of the
sentencing phase. This new "trial" replaces what had been a less
ritualized, more informal sentencing proceeding. By formalizing
the proceeding and, most importantly, by putting the issue of sen-
tence in the same form as the issue of guilt, a decision to be ren-
dered according to legislative rules, the sentencing process appears
more "legal." 26 The Court has sought to preempt emotive influ-
ence by mandating that sentencers follow rules in reaching their de-
cision. Ideally, sentencers would select an appropriate sentence by
virtue of rationalistic considerations captured in rules. The jurors
would have no opportunity to resort to their own personal ideas
about justice and so would have no opportunity to be influenced by
emotion. This regulatory effort has not, and can not, work,
however.
When the Supreme Court, in the early 1970s, began to reexam-
ine the constitutionality of the nation's capital punishment schemes,
it viewed their basic flaw as granting the decisionmaker too much
discretion. Sentencers such as those in the librarian murder case set
out above, rendered life and death decisions without legal guidance.
As a result they were rendering "arbitrary and capricious" decisions
based on factors not relevant to punishment, such as geography,
socio-economic background, or race. 27 Sentences were imposed
"out of whim, passion, prejudice or mistake."' 28
The Court's cure for excessive discretion was more rules. The
Court required states to specify guidelines for which offenses were
sufficiently aggravated to merit the death penalty.29 Yet this struc-
ture had little meaning. As long as the state listed possible aggra-
vating factors, and at least one of these was present in a particular
ues and discourages the expression of private bias. See Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee &
Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1387-89.
26 See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 372-83.
27 E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 242
(1976). Cf McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
28 Furman, 408 U.S. at 311 (Stewart, J., concurring).
29 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Prof-
fitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
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case, that was sufficient to justify death. 30 And even as the Court
commenced its regulatory effort, it resolved that sentences could
not be justly rendered solely by means of preset rules. Some discre-
tion must be permitted.3' The Court has held that mandatory death
sentences are unconstitutional and that what constitutes mitigation
may not be restricted by rules.3 2
In fact, after beginning its reform efforts in the apparent belief
that regulation could work a significant improvement in sentencing,
in recent years the Court increasingly has acknowledged the intrac-
tability of the tension between rules and discretion. The Court has
confronted the discretion dilemma: while giving sentencers discre-
tion allows them to render decisions on improper bases, regulation
of sentencing leads to its own form of moral errors resulting from
rule rigidity. The choice, therefore, is between two evils. Recogniz-
ing this, the Court has virtually abandoned the basic aims of its reg-
ulatory endeavor.33
The present constitutional status quo favors elaborate proce-
dural mechanisms for imposing death which do not clearly address
the substantive issue of who should and who should not receive the
maximum punishment.3 4 In most jurisdictions, pursuant to statu-
tory guidelines, the sentencer in the librarian murder cases would
receive a list of aggravating and mitigating factors, similar in nature
to the considerations the jurors originally weighed. While the resi-
dence of the defendant would not be among these, the guidelines
30 E.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008-13 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983). See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (no requirement of propor-
tionality review); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (no reversible error in consid-
eration of nonstatutory aggravation where there is statutory aggravation); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (no requirement ofjury sentencing); cf Godfrey v. Geor-
gia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (aggravating circumstance as defined by state invalid because
did not restrict cases where death could be imposed).
31 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976).
32 E.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978). See also Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987).
33 Burt, Disorder In the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MIcH. L. REV.
1741 (1987); Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of
Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1037 (1985); Weisberg, supra note 26; Note,
Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORtNELL L.
REV. 1129 (1984). Empirical studies suggest that statutory factors do not guide deci-
sionmakers; in fact, the most important factors to decisionmakers often are not included
in statutory guidelines. See Geiner & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1987-88); Barnett, Some
Distribution Patterns for Georgia Death Sentences, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327 (1985).
34 Scholarly comment has almost uniformly viewed the Court's efforts at regulating
the death sentencing process as a failure in its own terms. See Barnett, supra note 33;
Radin, supra note 6; Zimring & Hawkins, A Punishment in Search of a Crime: Standards for
Capital Punishment in the Law of Criminal Homicide, 46 MD. L. REV. 115 (1986).
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would not eliminate its tacit influence. The sentencer imposing
death could easily believe that it found for death based on aggravat-
ing factors relating to the egregious nature of the offense, without
ever recognizing the xenophobic influence of where the defendant
came from. Meanwhile, a sentencer imposing life could believe that
it was the evidence presented in mitigation that made the difference.
Both decisions would be unimpeachable because the guidelines give
courts no standards for weighing competing factors, yet the cases
remain indistinguishable on moral grounds. Such disparity is no
less likely and no more remediable with guidelines than without. If
this is the best we can do, it is hard to argue with Justice Harlan who
predicted eighteen years ago that any effort to regulate death sen-
tencing by rules would come to nothing.35
D. The Impossibility of Rule Regulation
The Supreme Court's regulatory campaign was doomed to fail-
ure for two reasons. First, the complexity of the desert evaluation
makes a complete a priori rule structure virtually impossible. Sec-
ond, no rule structure that overtly refers to retributive considera-
tions can be effective in suppressing emotion because these
considerations are inextricably intertwined with certain emotional
reactions.
1. Complexity of Evaluation
The question of what punishment an offender deserves requires
a complex factual and moral evaluation of the offender's action in
the offense. As previously discussed, if accuracy in desert evaluation
is paramount, as it is in the capital context, we must adopt a broad
view of culpability that defies encapsulation in rules. A brief look at
the basic components of culpability will illustrate the point. Con-
sider a few of the eventualities which would have to be resolved on a
legislative basis: harm-is it worse to kill one person by prolonged
suffocation than two by gunshot; motive-intentionality-is it worse
to kill for fun or for money; and autonomy-how much does a
mental disturbance not causing insanity matter? Even if we could
create a rule structure of sufficient sophistication to encompass all
the complexities of each component by itself, we would need a fur-
ther structure to evaluate them together. We would need a rule that
would state, for example, whether the mentally disturbed killer of
five deserves a harsher punishment than the contract killer of one.
Unless we make these assessments crudely, i.e., in a way that ignores
significant moral distinctions, it is impossible to imagine a rule
35 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204-08 (1971).
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structure sufficiently complete to assess deserved punishment with-
out resort to nonrule considerations. Even the most determinate of
recent sentencing schemes permit some sentencer discretion.36
Finally, any strategy of emotive suppression through rules
would fall prey to the limitations of language itself. No rule is en-
tirely determinate; the application of rules to facts always requires
some creativity and some independent consideration by the deci-
sionmaker.37 Human language is subject to variable interpretation;
in this it fatally varies from the determinate computer language nec-
essary for a rule structure that would preempt emotional influence.
2. The Emotionalism of Retribution
The emotional nature of retributive judgment presents an
equally significant obstacle to the suppression of emotive influence
by rule regulation. Deciding how much punishment a person de-
serves implicates emotions which cannot be suppressed as long as
the question is put in terms of what he or she deserves. Retribution
asks basic moral questions which often have emotional responses.
As long as the question is what does an offender deserve, the answer
is likely to be influenced by emotion.
a. Anger-The Most Feared Emotion
A victim's cry for bloody revenge disturbs us with its vitriol; a
xenophobe's wild rage at a stranger defendant seems clearly exces-
sive. The common man's rage at the offender, so reminiscent of the
paradigmatic lynch mob appears to be the great emotive evil to be
avoided in judgments of just punishment. 38 Thus the Court has
held that sentencers may not utilize victim impact statements in sen-
tencing because such "emotionally charged opinions," which pro-
voke anger, are "inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we
require in capital cases." 39  Under this view, the law in criminal
cases must act to suppress anger because anger expresses the in-
36 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (Supp. IV 1986); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1170, 3040 (West
1985 & Supp. 1988).
37 See Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 So. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981).
38 E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (need
to channel society's "instinct for retribution"); id. at 344-45 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(eighth amendment limits vengeance). See also id. at 254 (Douglas, J., concurring) (his-
torical view that eighth amendment grounded in need to prevent punishment as political
vengeance); id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that no state sought "naked
vengeance" in punishment); Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1701-02 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) decision to execute "appears responsive less to reason than other, more vis-
ceral demands.").
39 Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 (1987). This decision may be ex-
plained within the framework of this Article, however, as an effort to keep anger within
moral bounds. See generally infra Section III.
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stinctive and morally suspect urge for revenge. A classic statement
of the need for such emotive suppression comes from Professor
Henry Weihofen:
When a reprehensible crime is committed, strong emotional
reactions take place in all of us. Some people will be impelled to
go out at once and work off their tensions in a lynching orgy.
Even the calmest, most law-abiding of us is likely to be deeply
stirred.... It is one of the marks of a civilized culture that it has
devised legal procedures that minimize the impact of emotional
reactions and strive for calm and rational disposition.40
Retribution as a justification for punishment has often been criti-
cized as a cover for the emotion of revenge; after all, both find right-
eousness in another's suffering. 41
And yet, what is wrong with feeling anger at one who has delib-
erately and without justification caused another's suffering? By vir-
tue of the offender's freely made choice to inflict serious harm, we
can blame him and release upon him the full force of our anguish at
another's needless suffering.42 Because the victim's suffering was
humanly willed, we reject tragic explanations and are filled with a
God-like wrath at the offender.43 We might say that we are angry
because the offender deserves punishment. Indeed, justices have
justified the death penalty in emotive-retributive terms as the com-
munity's expression of "moral outrage" at the offense.44 The Court
has approved a judge's expression and reliance upon emotions of
shock and outrage as a basis for a death sentence. 45 In fact it is hard
to imagine a sentencer finding that an offender deserves a severe
punishment without that sentencer experiencing at least an under-
current of anger at the offender.
As will become clearer when we take up the nature of emotion,
retribution cannot be neatly divested of anger because both involve
judgments of wrong, of condemnation, and of the need for punish-
ment.46 Anger is a basic means of personal understanding and ex-
40 H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 131 (1959).
41 SeeJ. KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 50; Gardner, supra note 3, at 782. For a full discus-
sion of the conceptual and emotive distinctions between retribution and revenge, see
infra Section III(C)(3).
42 For traditional defenses of the anger of retribution, see I J. STEPHEN, supra note
24, at 478; SALMAND ON JURISPRUDENCE 120-21 (11 th ed. 1957), quoted in AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 21 (1971).
43 For a psychoanalytic explanation, see Wilson, Vengeance and Mercy: Implications of
Psychoanalytic Theory for the Retributive Theory of Punishment, 60 NEB. L. REV. 276, 287-92
(1981).
44 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); Spaziano, v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-51 (1983).
46 See infra Section III(C).
19891
CORNELL L4 W REVIEW
pression of moral wrong. The rationalistic judgment of retribution
also describes ajudgment which might trigger a form of anger. As a
result, in practice at least, no absolute separation of the two can be
accomplished.47
b. Sympathy
We sympathize with the suffering of fellow human beings.
When the object of sympathy is an offender, the emotion may have
moral content in terms of retribution. We may sympathize with of-
fenders for the mental disease which rendered them wholly or par-
tially nonresponsible. Here, sympathy tracks considerations
relevant to culpability. The Supreme Court has recognized that
sympathy may be morally valuable in determining just punish-
ment.48 Just as it is hard to imagine a harsh sentence without imag-
ining an undercurrent of anger, so it is hard to imagine a lenient
sentence under a retributive theory that is not motivated in part by
sympathy for the offender.
49
But sympathy can also distort culpability assessment. Sympa-
thizing with an offender based on his suffering may lead to excusing
an offense when little or no excuse should be available under retrib-
utive principles. A decisionmaker with a history of substance abuse
problems may excuse an offense by an alcoholic based on sympathy
for the condition of alcoholism when, under principles of personal
responsibility, we may agree that the condition had little impact in
the offender's responsibility. Sympathy for defendants based on
race or socioeconomic status can also lead to unjustified verdicts or
sentences. Courts expressly exclude sympathy from consideration
in decisions of guilt or innocence. 50 To sympathize smacks of weak
and amoral emotionalism at sentencing; its influence remains
suspect. 5'
47 This stands in contrast to other punishment theories. For example, the judg-
ment that a particular punishment is needed to deter others involves an assessment of
future impacts quite different from the assessments involved in anger or any other
strong emotion.
48 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987). See infra text accompanying
notes 142-49. See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 189 (1971) (capital sentenc-
ing instruction permitting jury decision based on "mere sentiment and sympathy for the
defendants"). For a psychoanalytic view, see Wilson, supra note 43, at 292-94.
49 By lenient I mean the opposite of harsh. If rendered under a retributive theory,
the sentence, however light, must be deserved.
50 E. DEvITr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.03
(3d ed. 1977) (The law does not permit jurors to be governed by sympathy, prejudice, or
public opinion.); CALIFORNIAJURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 1.00 (7th ed. 1986) (jurors "must
not be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or passim.").
51 See infra text accompanying notes 140-46. For an illuminating, though ambiva-
lent, view of "emotion and sympathy" in judicial sentencing, see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES 79 (1973). In two recent eleventh circuit cases, the prosector utilized a nine-
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E. Reconceptualization of the Problem-Moral Versus Amoral
Emotion
Under a retributive system, the effort to suppress all varieties of
decisionmaking anger or sympathy is neither morally justified, nor
practically feasible. Emotional reactions to penal issues are part of
basic human nature. They are also part of our moral experience.
What we need is a reconceptualization of the problem. We need to
discard the traditional opposition of Reason and Emotion and in-
stead distinguish between emotions. In short, we need to distin-
guish those emotions which are morally appropriate from those
which are not.
52
Instead of viewing the example of the librarian murders as a
demonstration of the evil of emotive influence generally, we should
see it as a demonstration of the need to discriminate between differ-
ent sorts of emotive influences. Amoral and immoral influences
must be identified and screened out, moral influences identified and
utilized. Hostility to the stranger-defendant based on his status as
an outsider is an amoral53 influence on judgment, but hostility
based on responsible wrongdoing is morally appropriate. Different
sorts of sympathy must also be distinguished. Sympathy for the res-
ident-defendant, based on residence, is amoral. I will argue, how-
ever, that that kind of sympathy defined as empathy, plays a morally
essential role in discretionary sentencing, operating in a similar
fashion to that sympathy in the case of the resident offender. It
serves to open the decisionmaker's eyes to relevant factors which
would otherwise remain unseen and unconsidered.
Having established that emotion is not a monolithic force for
either justice or injustice, we must further explore its basic nature to
teenth century Georgia Supreme Court case where the court denounced "sickly senti-
mentality" and stated, "If this crime goes unpunished, let our skirts at least be free from
the stain of blood guiltiness." In both cases, the eleventh circuit reversed based on the
prosecutors' misleading implication that the sentencing jury could not consider mercy.
Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 623 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986);
Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1020 (1986).
52 My purpose here is different from that of emotivists, who seek to define morality
in terms of sensation statements. E.g., cf. C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944);
G. MOORE, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (1922);J. URMSON, THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETmICS
(1968). The moral theories of eighteenth century philosophers David Hume and Adam
Smith, both of which gave a central role to sympathy, are essentially emotivist. See P.
MERCER, SYMPATHY AND ETHICS 20-96 (1972); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
bks II & III (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1967); A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
(Ist ed. 1759). For a broad-ranging critique of emotivism, see A. MACINTRYE, AFTER
VIRTUE 11-22 (2d ed. 1984).
53 Hereinafter, for purposes of simplicity, when I refer to the problem of emotive
influence I will call it amoral influence, as opposed to amoral and immoral. However,
the phrase should be taken to include immoral influences as well.
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understand the complex relation of emotion to the moral objectives
of criminal sentencing.
II
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EMOTIONS
The law's general distrust of emotion comports with a vener-
able philosophic tradition that contrasts reason with emotion. 54
This view holds that justice is determined by moral reason uninflu-
enced by emotion. Under this view emotions are passive, irrational
occurrences. The experience of emotion is an event beyond the in-
dividual's control which undermines rationality and impinges upon
moral responsibility. In fact, emotion and reason have a far more
complex relationship than this traditional view maintains. Our ra-
tional capacities are critical to both emotion and reason. And while
there are limits to emotive self-control, there is no reason to believe
that emotion lies beyond our control. Indeed, we commonly hold
each other responsible for our emotions in both law and interper-
sonal relations. Recognizing the rationality of emotion and the ex-
tent of our responsibility for emotion provides the basis for
understanding how we may "moralize" the emotions in a particular
decisional context.
A. A Cognitive Theory of Emotion
Emotions have been variously categorized as purely physical
sensations, as behavioral occurrences, as creatures of the uncon-
scious, and as essentially cognitive evaluations. 55 The task of build-
ing and defending a complete theory to define, categorize and
explain emotion is one which has been undertaken by philosophers
dating back to Aristotle;56 and by psychologist beginning with the
54 E.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk V (P. Shorey trans. 1956); R. DESCARTES, THE PAS-
SIONS OF THE SOUL: A READING OF LES PASSIONS DE L'AME (S. Voss trans. 1988); Seneca,
De Ira, in I MORAL ESSAYS (J. Basore trans. 1928); FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note
6, at 104-05. Even within this group, however, careful reading may discern passages
compatible with a view of moral value in emotion. See De Sousa, Self-Deceptive Emotions,
in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 127 (A. Rorty ed. 1980) (suggesting that Plato saw emotion as
compatible with rationality); DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE, supra note 6, at 115-30.
55 For an overview of the various approaches, see Calhoun & Solomon, What is an
Emotion? in WHAT IS AN EMOTION? 3-40 (1984); W. LYONS, EMOTION 1-52 (1980); W.
SHIBLES, EMOTION (1974).
56 E.g., ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC bk II, 1378a-380; DE ANIMA 403a-403b; ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1125b-1126b. Aristotle developed a cognitive theory of the
emotion much like the modem cognitive theories relied upon in this Article. See Cal-
houn & Solomon, supra note 55, at 3-8, 42-43. Aristotle's work also provides a classical
example of the union of emotion and morality, which I support. Aristotle accomplished




work of William James and C.G. Lange in the nineteenth century. 57
In both fields there exists an extensive literature on the theory of
emotion. As with the selection of a theory of punishment, I do not
attempt to justify my choice of a cognitive theory of emotion.
Although I suggest why a cognitive theory explains emotion, my pri-
mary focus is on application of the cognitive theory of emotion to a
particular legal context: judgments of retributive punishment.
1. The Basic Elements of Emotion
In recent years cognitive theories of emotion have dominated
both the philosophical and the psychological literature on the sub-
ject.58 Cognitive theories come in many varieties, but all share the
idea that cognition is central to emotion. By cognition I mean a
perception which we can determine to be correct or incorrect ac-
cording to rational principles. A cognitive approach holds that
emotion is a cognitive assessment 59 of a person or situation, which
assessment is associated with a physiological sensation, normally ac-
companied by a desire to undertake a particular kind of action.60
Consider the anger provoked by the discovery of a burglary of one's
home. The object of cognition is the burglary. On seeing a shat-
tered window and disordered home, the victim perceives that a
great wrong has been done to her. A burglar has deliberately vio-
lated her private space. If the homeowner later determines, how-
ever, that the window was broken by a wind-blown tree limb and
that there was no burglar, her anger will quickly dissipate because
the cognitive assessment of wrong necessary for anger would have
disappeared. Assuming a perception that a burglary has occurred,
the cognitive evaluation of wrong leads to a sensation, the bodily
57 See W.JAMES & C. LANGE, THE EMOTIONS (1st ed. 1890).
58 For philosophically oriented views, see R. GORDON, THE STRUCTURE OF EMO-
TIONS: INVESTIGATIONS IN COGNITIVE PHILOSOPHY (1987); W. LYONS, supra note 55; R.
DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF THE EMOTIONS (1987); R. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS
(1976); Roberts, What an Emotion Is: A Sketch, 97 PHIL. REV. 183 (1988). For psychologi-
cal studies, see N. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS (1983); see generally 1 EMOTION: THEORY, RE-
SEARCH, AND EXPERIENCE (R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman eds. 1980).
59 The exact nature of the cognition in emotion is a matter of some controversy
among cognitive theorists. Compare R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 185-91 (cognition in
emotions as ajudgment); and W. LYONS, supra note 55, at 53-91 (cognition in emotions
as a cognitive evaluation), with Roberts, supra note 58. Ronald De Sousa offers a com-
plex cognitive view of emotion as its own distinctive form of rational interpretation of
the world. R. DE SOUSA, supra note 58 (emotions as a cognitive construal). While impor-
tant for a precise understanding of emotion, the exact nature of the cognition in emo-
tion does not have great significance for its application to moral decisionmaking. Under
all theories, cognition is a perception of the truth of a person or situation that is subject
to examination. To make clear that I am not resolving the controversy, I have picked a
neutral term, "assessment," to describe the cognition involved.
60 W. LYONS, supra note 55, at 53-95; R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 172-182. See
Irani, Understanding Emotion, in EMOTION: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 1-19 (1983).
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experience that we associate with the emotion of anger. This sensa-
tion of heightened tension, or, in psychological terms, arousal,
probably represents a physiological change in the holder of the
emotion, although this is not clearly so for all emotions. Finally, the
emotion of anger characteristically involves a desire to engage in
denunciatory and punitive action: in this instance to find and pun-
ish the burglar.61
Both the sensational and behavioral aspects of emotion have
proven tempting candidates for differentiating the various emo-
tions. Psychologists have, at various times distinguished emotions
based on their characteristic behaviors or sensations.62 For re-
searchers with a phenomenological focus, both aspects are attractive
possibilities because both involve objective phenomena. Bodily
changes can be measured, actions observed. If cognition distin-
guishes the emotions, however, objective testing is difficult because
cognition is an internal, subjective phenomenon. Yet neither sensa-
tion nor behavior has withstood close scrutiny as the means for dis-
tinguishing emotions. Sensations are ambiguous indicators of
emotions-the same sensation of sweat and tensed muscles may ac-
company anger and anxiety. 63 Similarly, the same behavior may ac-
company different emotions. We cry for joy and for sorrow. 64
Sensation and behavior are integral parts of emotion, but the cogni-
tive element is what distinguishes one emotion from another.65
2. Emotion As World View
Dissecting emotion into its component parts provides a begin-
ning to emotive understanding, but full comprehension requires an
understanding of the function of emotions. Emotions are funda-
61 For a full cognitive dissection of anger, see R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 283-86.
For a social-constructivist view, see J. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON
EMOTION (1982).
62 See W. JAMES & C. LANGE, supra note 57.
63 W. LYONS, supra note 55, at 607, 130-45; R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 150-58;
Bergmann, A Monologue on the Emotions, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN EMOTIONS 3-4 (F.
Miller & T. Attig eds. 1979).
64 See Cannon, The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A Critical Examination;, 39 AM J.
PSYCHOLOGY 106 (1927); Schacter & Singer, Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants
of Emotional State, 69 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 379 (1962). For an insightful critique ofJames
Schacter's influential work in psychology emphasizing cognition as the process by which
physiological responses are "labelled" as emotions, see R. GORDON, THE STRUCTURE OF
EMOTIONS: INVESTIGATIONS IN COGNITIVE PHILOSOPHY 86-109 (1987).
65 See W. LYONS, supra note 55, at 2-25; R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 164-71;
MacIntrye, Emotion, Behavior and Belief, in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE 230-43
(1971). For a cognitive view that accords an important role to the biological aspects of
emotion, see De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 47-106 (A.
Rorty ed. 1980). In psychology, the debate over the primacy of the physiological and
the cognitive continues. See Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 117
(1984); Lazarus, On the Primacy of Cognition, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 124 (1984).
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mentally a way of making sense of the world. We use emotion to
synthesize chaotic reality and give it personal meaning. Emotion
provides the basic means for relating the inner subjective self to the
outer objective world. 66 I can describe a friend in objective terms
on which other observers could agree, but what my friend means to
me is subjective and emotional. The way I experience my friend, as
a friend, is by my caring about him or her. My subjective caring is a
critical part of the friendship; there can be no friendship without it.
Recognizing that I care allows me to recognize the importance of
the relationship in my life.
Emotions also serve as a guide to rational inquiry. They pro-
vide a patter of salience which helps order our thoughts and ac-
tions. 67 In our lives we accumulate enormous quantities of data.
Emotions direct our attention to certain aspects of a situation, sug-
gest certain approaches. Even philosophers may begin work on a
difficult problem with a "gut" or emotional reaction.
Emotions do more than this, however. They make life interest-
ing. They provide meaning in a way that reason cannot. We can not
imagine achieving a personal goal without experiencing an emo-
tional lift, or experiencing a personal failure without emotional con-
sequences. Without the emotional component, we can not honestly
say that these events mean anything to us. Our emotions constitute
reality and give us the means for finding importance in our
existence.
68
B. Responsibility For Emotions-Suggestions From the
Common Law and the Commonplace
Under the traditional view, emotions "happen" to a person.
They occur without being willed and tend to overwhelm all that we
would will; they destroy rationality and responsibility. 69 If this is so,
emotion presents a serious threat to rational, responsible decision-
making. The traditional view, however, represents a fundamental
misconception about emotion. Although there are significant obsta-
cles to emotive self-control, self-control is possible. Both the formal
rules of criminal law and the informal rules of interpersonal rela-
66 See R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 16-20, 171-250; Calhoun, Cognitive Emotions, in
WHAT Is AN EMOTION?, supra note 55, at 339. For the view that emotions provide the key
to understanding the self, see Rosenthal, Emotions and the Self, in EMOTION: PHILOSOPHI-
CAL STUDIES, supra note 60, at 164-91.
67 R. DE SOUSA, supra note 58, at 190-203.
68 See R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 15-16; D. Visco-rr, THE LANGUAGE OF FEELINGS
11-14, 19 (1976).
69 For general statements of the traditional view and criticisms of it see Solomon,
Emotions and Choice, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 54, at 251; Williams, Morality and
the Emotions, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 207 (1973).
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tions provide examples of how we commonly insist upon emotive
self-control.
1. Provocation
At first glance the criminal law's distinction between a pur-
poseful homicide committed with "malice aforethought" and one
committed in a "heat of passion" might present an example of the
traditional view of emotion. 70 Under the traditional view, the first
offense is more evil because it represents a cooler, more rational
choice to do evil. The second offense is mitigated by provocation-
an onslaught of emotion which unhinges reason.
7 1
The doctrine of provocation makes important concessions to
emotive responsibility, however. First, provocation mitigates the of-
fense from murder to manslaughter; it does not excuse it. The the-
ory appears to be that even extreme emotions do not overwhelm
reason; they make reasoned choice difficult, but not impossible.
72
Second, provocation does not refer to a purely sensational state but
to an emotional state based on a particular sort of cognitive assess-
ment. The doctrine is available only for those situations where the
provocation is reasonable - where we can understand and morally
sympathize with, if not excuse, the motivation. 73 Provocation distin-
guishes between various cognitive assessments which give rise to
passionate violent feelings. The law differentiates between a killing
inspired by the sight of a spouse in bed with another partner from
one inspired by a verbal slight. This distinction lies not in differ-
ences in the feeling of sudden anger but in the reason for such anger.
In conclusion, the doctrine of provocation is consistent with a
cognitive view of emotion.74 The doctrine recognizes that emotions
often compete with deliberative rationality in the choice of conduct,
but also recognizes the moral aspect of emotion. If the emotion is
strong enough and its cognitive assessment of a morally relevant
70 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 7.7, 7.10 (2d ed. 1986).
71 The emotionalism of provocation makes it a somewhat controversial doctrine. It
permits mitigation for losing one's temper, a character trait for which individuals are
normally held responsible. See Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM.
L. REv. 740, 751-52.
72 In a particular instance, we may be willing to concede that an extreme emotion
did overwhelm reason and lower the offense from murder to manslaughter. However,
the fact that we still hold the person culpable demonstrates that we find fault with the
person for allowing himself or herself to be so vulnerable to emotion. In other words,
we view responsibility for emotions over a broader chronologic span than the usual
mental state analysis.
73 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 70, at § 7.10(b). E.g., Commonwealth v. Flax,
331 Pa. 145, 149, 200 A. 632, 637 (1938) ("The law regards with some tolerance an
unlawful act impelled by ajustifiably passionate heart, but has no tolerance whatever for
an unlawful act impelled by a malicious heart"); Williams, supra note 69, at 207-29.
74 See generally J. AVERILL, supra note 61, at 103-25.
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kind, the influence of emotion upon the criminal decision will miti-
gate culpability. Only the union of these two elements permits a
reduction in responsibility. No emotion, regardless of strength, will
supply an excuse unless it is based upon a cognitive assessment
which has moral content.
2. The Commonplace View of Emotion
The commonplace view of emotions and our responsibility for
them is equally complex. We commonly use emotions as an excuse
from responsibility. A husband tells his wife he is sorry for yelling at
her yesterday but he was "just so upset about everything" he could
not help it. But do we really believe the husband is blameless if the
shouting was not rationally justified? We generally blame others for
acting on anger if the anger was unjustified, and in close relation-
ships blame them for being unjustifiably angry because the experi-
ence of such strong emotion invariably affects the relationship.
Emotional responses are a critical part of character evaluation. We
praise the good samaritans among us who feel kindly to those in
need and help them; we criticize those who view the needy with hos-
tility and ignore their plight. In short, we judge ourselves as if we
believe ourselves responsible for our emotions.
C. Deliberative and Emotive Judgments
The discussion so far suggests that emotive control is possible,
but not that it is easy. In fact, the common use of emotion as an
excuse both in the law and in everyday life suggests that emotive
control is difficult. In order to deal with emotions in a decisional
context we must understand the nature of this difficulty.
Even though emotions have their own cognitive rationality, this
rationality is of a different order than that of deliberate, reflective
judgments. One does not normally experience sadness, for exam-
ple, because one (a) consciously observes that certain logical pre-
requisites for sadness are present, and then (b) decides, based on
this, to feel sad. Instead, following some triggering event, one is
likely to simply "feel" sad. The suddenness of the experience, its
strength, and the lack of a deliberative trigger lead to the assump-
tion that the emotion is a nonrational force that happens to us. 75
Cognitive theorists have suggested several ways of reconciling the
apparently noncognitive experience of emotion with its cognitive
nature.
Philosopher Ronald De Sousa has suggested that the cognitive
assessment of emotion follows a set of internal paradigm scena-
75 See Roberts, supra note 58, at 208.
1989] 679
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
rios.
7 6 For each emotion we have learned a paradigm scenario. We
compare later situations to the paradigm to determine if the emo-
tion is appropriate. Anger involves the imagining of a paradigm
scenario of accusation and denunciation, perhaps taken from a para-
digm scene of parental punishment. A situation that makes us angry
is one which fits our paradigm scenario. Once we decide that anger
is appropriate, we relive the scenario of accusation and denunciation
with the appropriate alterations for the situation.
Robert Solomon presents a similar, but more active view of
emotion, arguing that we use emotions to develop a constitutive my-
thology of the world. 77 Emotion transforms impersonal reality into
personal myth. Anger involves transforming a situation involving a
perceived wrong into a mythic confrontation between avenging vic-
tim and wrongdoer. The angry self becomes the accuser, the adju-
dicator and punisher; the wrongdoer becomes the accused and the
convicted awaiting punishment.
Whichever version of the cognitive theory we use, the rational-
ity of emotion operates at a different level than ordinary deliberative
thought processes. Emotions are normally prereflective. Their cog-
nitive assessment is normally made without conscious, deliberate ef-
fort. They may depend on cognitive sources of which the'conscious
mind is not otherwise aware. 78 They represent the intersection be-
tween the mind's subjective surreality and the objective reality of
the world. Emotive cognitions may make sense in terms of the
world view they presuppose, but not necessarily in terms of reflec-
tive rationality. A person may live in terror of ants, believing that
even a single one might devour him. This belief does not comport
with reality; it is irrational. But given this belief, fear provoked by
the sight of an ant is entirely rational. It is the cognitive assessment
which is mistaken. The problem which any theory seeking to em-
ploy emotions for rational goals must address is how to alter, or at
least control, emotions that are based on mistaken cognitions.
D. Strategies For Emotive Control
The first step to emotive control is understanding emotion.
Emotion generally constitutes a prereflective assessment and so
does not involve our conscious, deliberative capacities. Yet the ex-
perience of having an emotion necessarily involves cognition and
some level of self-awareness. The very denomination of a sensation
76 De Sousa, Self-Deceptive Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 54, at 285;
De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions, in id. at 142-43; see also Solomon, Emotion and Choice,
in id. at 275.
77 R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 195-240.
78 See generally Calhoun, supra note 66.
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as a particular emotion entails rational analysis. To say that one is
angry about something implies an evaluation of wrong in the pro-
voking situation. Sometimes emotion appears without an immedi-
ate cause. I am angry or sad, but not sure why. I recognize the basic
cognitive structure of the emotion, but its object remains hidden. I
will attempt to find it by testing various hypotheses. Was it that per-
son's manner, what she said, or my own sense of insecurity which
provoked the sensation? We can not always resolve these questions
ourselves but we live in the presumption that generally we can. If
we were not capable of emotive self-analysis we could not claim to
be self-aware or autonomous.
Emotions develop from and are subject to the rational process
of learning, although in a more complex fashion than intellectual
development. By cultural influence and direct education we learn
which emotions are appropriate in particular situations and which
are not.7 9 We learn to regulate their degree and the manner of their
expression. 0 Parents teach children to feel sorry when they do
something wrong and to feel good at accomplishing good. The
point of such moral education is less the inculcation of rules than
the education of the emotions.81 Moral education, at its best, is di-
rected toward character development rather than rule obedience.8 2
Upon reasoned reflection, we can often change a mistaken emo-
tion.83 If I learn that what appeared to be someone stealing my car
was in fact someone taking their own car that looks identical to
mine, then the anger that accompanied the first perception disap-
pears. The key is the new evaluation. Consider the example of a
driver who feels terrible guilt following a car accident in which an-
other was killed. Even without new information concerning the
cause of the accident, with the proper reassurance from others, the
driver may shed his guilty feelings and return to emotive equilib-
rium by reassessing his fault in the accident.
In criminal law, the doctrines of premeditation and provocation
illustrate the moral significance of reasoned reflection upon emo-
tion. A premeditated murder is one committed following reflective
reappraisal of the situation. It represents a fully deliberated,
79 See R. DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION, supra note 58, at 181-84;
Scruton, Emotion, Practical Knowledge and Common Culture, in id. at 519-31.
80 See Averill, Acquisition of Emotions in Adulthood, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
EMOTIONS 113-14 (R. Harre ed. 1986).
81 Williams, supra note 69, at 225.
82 See generally A. MACINTYRE, supra note 52; Donagan, Morality As A Disposition of
Affection and Conduct, in THE THEORY OF MORALITY 9-31 (1977).




although still emotionally influenced, decision.8 4 As such it repre-
sents the most culpable form of homicide. Provocation on the other
hand, by its emotive and chronologic restrictions, isolates certain
prereflective decisions to kill. A person acting under the heat of
passion has not had a good opportunity for reflective reappraisal of
the provoking situation 8 5 This lack of opportunity mitigates
culpability.
8 6
Another form of reflective reappraisal is to employ the imagina-
tion to deliberately "try on" another emotion. Consider a wife who
criticizes her husband for unjustifiably yelling at her the day before.
The sincerity and depth of the wife's assertions persuade the hus-
band to reimagine the situation of the previous day. The husband
experiments with a new paradigm scenario, a new mythology of
what occurred. The husband imagines himself as seen by his wife,
that is, as insensitive brute rather than righteous critic. From this
new perspective he sees the hurt he caused. The husband may not
conclude from this effort that his shouting was wrong, but he still
will have learned something of how this action was experienced by
his wife. He will have obtained important moral insight.
8 7
To some extent, emotive testing is simply acting. The individ-
ual acts out a new role in his mind and, if it plays true, adopts it as
the truth.88 The process is rational but not necessarily deliberative.
The judgment that the new role rings true may be an intuitive one,
based on accumulated life experience, rather then an articulable, de-
liberative decision based on clear principles. The husband
reimagines the situation under the mythology of guilt and sees the
rightness of that view when compared with his original vision. Or
the judgment may be quite deliberate. Imagining that he feels
guilty, the husband reviews possible reasons for feeling that way and
may, by a deliberative process, find those reasons compelling.
Changing the cognitive proposition upon which emotion is
based is not the only means of emotional reappraisal. It may be that
the cognition is correct but that the resulting emotion works against
the person's interest. Here we must undertake a more ambitious
reassessment. A soldier in battle may realize he is in danger but
84 Thus the required mental state toward killing is "deliberate and premeditated."
Deliberation "requires a cool mind that is capable of reflection" and premeditation that
"the one with the cool mind did in fact reflect." W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 70, at
§ 7.7(a); see People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942 (1968).
85 Thus the doctrine concerning a "cooling off" period. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 70, §§ 7.10(c), (d).
86 Although only when it combines with a morally sympathetic cognitive source. See
supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
87 See R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 228.
88 See generally C. STANISLAVSKI, AN ACTOR PREPARES (E. Hapgood trans. 1948).
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attempt to re-envision the situation in terms of patriotic duty in or-
der to combat the debilitating effects of fear.89 A defense attorney
who represents a defendant clearly guilty of a particularly heinous
crime may feel personally horrified at her client's conduct. The at-
torney may alter her emotional approach, not by re-evaluating the
client, but by re-envisioning the situation. Instead of viewing the
defendant as the Criminal, the lawyer sees him as the Accused and
instead of viewing herself as the Criminal's Representative, she be-
comes the Advocate for Justice, courageous in its most difficult
service.90
E. Obstacles to Emotive Understanding and Control
The forces that combine to create an initial emotional reaction
are complex and often hidden. They include genetic makeup, cul-
tural teachings, and personal background. 9 ' As a result, we all ex-
perience emotions which we realize are unjustified, either in basis or
degree, but which resist change. A person may conduct personal
relationships in a manner destructive to those relationships because
of deeply engrained emotive patterns, even while recognizing the
destructive pattern and wishing to change it. Intellectual insight
alone is often insufficient to alter the emotional dynamic. 92 As mod-
em psychology teaches, we learn, feel and act according to
processes which vary in their accessibility to deliberative influence.
Those unwarranted emotions that resist our deliberative efforts
at reform are not the most serious obstacles to emotive control in
moral decisionmaking, however. The fact that we try to change the
emotion or its conclusion signifies an awareness of the problem.
89 See Roberts, supra note 58, at 190-201.
90 See N. FRIJDA, supra note 58, at 429; id. at 401-50 (reviewing methods of emotion
regulation).
91 See Rorty, Explaining Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 54, at 105-06.
Many philosophers and psychologists have argued for the primacy of cultural aspects of
emotion. See generally THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS, supra note 80; R. DE
SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTIONS, supra note 58, at 249-52.
92 See Calhoun, supra note 66, at 327-42. Calhoun discusses the distinction between
intellectual knowledge, which is based on conscious, deliberative reasoning, and eviden-
tial knowledge, which is based on direct experience. Calhoun uses this distinction to
explain, within a cognitive theory of emotion, the apparent paradox of persons simulta-
neously holding contradictory intellectual and emotional appraisals of a situation. See
also Roberts, supra note 58, at 196-201; R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 421-22; cf Rorty,
supra note 91, at 103-26. This raises the central philosophical problem for a cognitive
approach: how emotions are intentional, i.e., involve rational decisionmaking, yet re-
main submerged in consciousness. Many different explanations have been offered. See,
e.g., R. DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF THE EMOTIONS, supra note 58, at 92-105; Rorty,
supra; Warner, Anger and Similar Delusions, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTION,
supra note 80, at 149-5 1. Most promising seem De Sousa's and Rorty's use of a multi-
leveled, multi-faceted model of intentionality, suggesting a self influenced by many fac-
tors and only partially integrated at the level of highest consciousness.
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Awareness, even if it does not lead to emotive change, presents the
opportunity for separating emotional impulse from deliberate ac-
tion. Even if a legal decisionmaker cannot suppress an unwarranted
emotion, for example, she can work to insulate the decision from
the influence of that emotion. If we can feel angry enough at an-
other person to want to kill him and yet desist, surely we can experi-
ence certain emotions in a legal context and yet minimize their
decisional impact. This is not an easy or optimal solution, but, in
some instances, it may be the best we can do.
The more dangerous emotions in terms of amoral influence are
those that the holder does not recognize: self-deceptive emotions.
93
If I act in a way that causes another pain, I may "decide" that I do
not want to feel bad about it. As part of my strategy of avoiding
guilt, I concentrate on all the ways that the victim is to blame for the
situation until I feel anger at the victim and can act with an appar-
ently free conscience. My anger is self-deceptive because it is built
on a cognitive fiction.
The law's myth of dispassion encourages a kind of emotional
self-deception. Here, the individual does not deceive himself as to
the kind of emotion experienced but to the very fact of an emotional
experience. In a context where all are emotionally torn, the deci-
sionmaker may seek immunity from emotion. He concentrates so
hard on rationalistic considerations that he denies having any feel-
ings about the matter in dispute. Yet in reality emotional influence
has not disappeared; it has merely gone underground, where its in-
fluence may remain substantial. In this situation, when the deci-
sionmaker justifies his ruling by rationalistic reasons, he does not
provide a moral, rational or causal explanation, he supplies a ration-
alization of an unexamined emotive conclusion.
94
Self-deception in the emotional arena is a basic fact of life and a
major cause of the law's distrust of emotions. Yet we are not help-
less to combat it. Self-deception thrives only where we lack a com-
mitment to self-honesty. Honest reflective reappraisal will expose
the deception, leaving it open to change. 95 If we have the courage
to face our true selves, the dangers of self-deceptive emotions and
self-deception about emotion will prove manageable.
93 See generally De Sousa, The Rationality of the Emotions, supra note 58, at 147-48; De
Sousa, Self-Deceptive Emotions, supra note 54, at 283-97; R. SOLOMON, supra note 59, at
287-88.
94 See R. SOLOMON, supra note 58, at 395-412; De Sousa, Self-Deceptive Emotions, supra
note 54, at 287-88.





RETRIBUTION IN EMOTIVE TERMS
We have established so far that, where accuracy is all-important,
sentencing under a retributive theory requires sentencer discretion,
that given discretion sentencers are necessarily subject to the influ-
ence of certain emotional reactions that may or may not be morally
relevant, and that emotions are based on cognitive assessments and
so are subject to rational control. The final step in the argument is
to show how we may exercise moral control of the emotions so that
decisions of deserved punishment will be morally justified, even if
emotional. This will be accomplished in two stages: first, by con-
structing a moral-emotive theory of punishment; and second, by de-
vising a means of translating that theory into meaningful and
accessible emotive terms.
A. A Moral-Emotive Theory of Punishment
Emotions as they are commonly categorized do not comport
with moral principles, or at least not with principles of deserved
punishment. 96 As we have seen, the dominant emotions with regard
to punishment-anger and sympathy-can be moral or amoral as
they apply to the issue of what punishment is deserved. In order to
bridge the gap between emotion and morality, we must translate our
moral theory of retribution based on respect for persons into an
emotional construct. We must find an emotive equivalent to the
base-line principle of respect for persons and then determine how
that principle applies to retributive punishment. I adopt the Biblical
concept of agape as the emotive counterpart of the respect for per-
sons principle. Agape encompasses the essence of respect for ra-
tional, moral persons but describes the respect principle in
emotional terms.
97
96 There may be a closer link between emotions and moral principles under other
moral constructs, such as hedonism. For a discussion of emotivism which also posits a
more direct relationship, see supra note 59.
97 This move to theology may provoke at least two opposing objections which
should be addressed. First, some may object that secular morality stands entirely apart
from theological ethics and that the secular morality of law must remain free of theo-
logic influence. Yet morality is morality whatever its origins. The ethical principle of
caring for others that I employ may be found in the work of Kant as well as in the Bible.
See THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE, supra note 6, at 118. As I use this principle, it is secular,
dealing only with human relations. I acknowledge its theological origins in order to
emphasize the concept's emotive force, which is often lost in the translation to secular
objects. Theologians embrace the emotions as critical to moral character; all too often
philosophers treat the emotions as the stuff of moral heresy.
The second objection may come from theologians who object to severing a reli-
gious concept such as agape from its theistic roots. Within the Christian tradition, the
ideal love of humans for each other flows from God's gift of love for all humans, even
*those who sin. E.g., C. SPIcO% AGAPE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 141-43 (M. McNamara &
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1. Respect For Persons and Agape
Respect for persons holds that our fundamental obligation to
other persons is to respect them because of their capacity to recog-
nize and make free moral choices. The obligation of agape,98 the
Greek term used in the New Testament of the Bible to describe
man's ideal love for his fellow man, provides an emotive counterpart
to the respect principle. 99 Like respect for persons, the obligation
of agape is to value all persons, but the valuing is stated in emotive
rather than cognitive terms. Agape requires not that one respect
one's neighbor, but that one "love thy neighbor as thyself."'
0 0
Agape is "the basic 'law of life,'" based on man's distinguishing
characteristic, his freedom to choose between good and evil. 10' It is
man's ability to choose his own moral destiny which makes the deci-
sion to feel agape for another a moral one. 10 2 Agape's focus on es-
sential moral worth distinguishes it from other kinds of caring for
persons.
Agape contrasts with the other Greek word for love, "eros,"
which refers to passionate, romantic love.' 03 Eros involves a per-
sonal, ego-based attachment to another; agape refers to an affection
without ego or hope of personal gain.10 4 Eros is a form of self-love,
an attachment to another based on the lover's self-interest. Self-
M. Richter trans. 1963); translator's preface to id. at ix; C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR LOVES 174-
92 (1960). To wrest it from the theistic context necessarily alters the concept. This may
be so, but the theistic origins of the concept are irrelevant to my present purposes. The
principle is basic to our moral system and does not depend for its secular correctness on
its theologic heritage. For purposes of this Article, I consider it as a secular moral
principle.
98 There are a number of different versions of agape. I have tried to work with the
core concept here. For a survey of the many varieties of agape discussed by theologians
and philosophers, see G. OuTrr, AGAPE (1972).
99 R. DOWNIE & E. TELFER, RESPECT FOR PERSONS 29 (1970); MacLagan, Respect for
Persons as a Moral Principle-I, 35 PHIL. 193, 207 (1960).
100 Matthew 22:37-40.
101 Robertson, Introduction to R. NIEBUHR, LOVE AND JUSTICE, SELECTIONS FROM THE
SHORTER WRITINGS OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR 12 (D. Robertson ed. 1957).
102 See IV K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS pt. 2, at 733 (G. Bromiley trans. 1958).
103 See D. DE ROUGEMONT, LOVE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (M. Belgion trans. 1956).
104 Some theologians have contended that agape is an ethical attitude rather than an
emotion. See J. FLETCHER, SITUATIONS ETHICS 104-06 (1966). However, I cannot see
how any term which translates as "love" and mandates caring for others can be defined
as unemotional. See P. TILLICH, LOVE, POWER AND JUSTICE 3 (1954) (agape "elicits a
feeling of warmth, of passion, of happiness, of fulfillment, whenever it is used."). In the
effort to distinguish agape from such ego-based feelings as friendship and romantic
love, Fletcher and others have confused distinctions relating to moral content with the
distinction between an attitude and an emotion. Both agape and romantic love describe
emotions; they cannot be distinguished by calling one a "feeling" and the other an "atti-
tude." They are distinct from one another only because of the different moral content
of the judgments upon which they are based. Romantic love is a love for personal gain,
even if it is expressed as the union of the self with another, while agape is selfless love
without any hope of personal gain.
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interested love has its own value, as in friendship or family relations,
but as long as the emotional tie depends upon a relationship special
to the lover, it is an affection distinct from agape. 10 5 Agape repre-
sents an affection without hope of or need for personal return.
Although agape may bring benefits to the one who feels it, that is
not its motivation.
2. Retribution As Moral Caring
As we have seen, respect for persons constitutes a set of moral
principles that operate differently in different contexts. It provides
different answers according to the questions asked. As a base-line
principle of moral treatment, respect for persons places an absolute
limit on conduct harmful to others and an absolute limitation on the
nature of punishment. Respect for persons also provides a principle
of moral evaluation, directing the assessment of culpability and the
determination of proportional punishment.
Agape also operates differently according to context. As a prin-
ciple of universal and unvarying moral treatment, agape sets the ba-
sic moral and emotional obligation of humans in their personal
relationships. Agape, like respect for persons, values the moral po-
tential of all humans. Agape urges a uniform love for others regard-
less of individual characteristics, including moral conduct. Thus,
theologians argue that to have agape for another means identifica-
tion with another's interests "in utter independence of the question
of his attractiveness."' 1 6 Agape represents an absolute and un-
forfeitable affection for another person, independent of the person's
demonstrated weakness or evil.
10 7
This requirement of universal love presents an obvious prob-
lem in the punishment context. How can the obligation to love all
persons equally, regardless of wrongdoing, be squared with the re-
tributive principle that persons must be punished in proportion to
their wrongdoing? The answer lies in distinguishing contexts. We
must distinguish agape as a first order moral principle that sets a
universal standard for personal relations from agape as it operates
within one subset of human relations: the formal, legal duties of
citizens to each other. We must distinguish between a purely moral
obligation informing all personal interactions and a more limited
moral obligation which informs legal relations. The distinction par-
allels that previously made with respect for persons, between the
principle as a standard of universal moral treatment and as a stan-
105 See IV K. BARTH, supra note 102, at 730-36.
106 Id. at 745.
107 R. DOWNIE & E. TELFER, supra note 99, at 19-20.
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dard of moral evaluation.108
Because man's basic worth depends upon his the capacity to
make moral choices, it follows that the exercise of morality is impor-
tant. If the exercise of morality is important, it must have conse-
quences. Both agape and respect for persons suggest, therefore,
that bad moral choices should be punished and good choices re-
warded. To put this valuing in emotional terms, we should hate bad
choices and love good ones. This need not contradict the first prin-
ciple of caring for all persons because we can still care for them as
persons while hating their bad choices. As St. Augustine wrote, the
moral person "ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred,
so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love
the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man."' 0 9
In retributive punishment, therefore, it should be appropri-
ate-and sufficient-for the sentencer to hate the criminal deed.
While the sentencer retains that agapic duty to care for the offender
as another fellow human, that sort of caring appears irrelevant to
the particular issue of the amount of punishment deserved. While,
to paraphrase St. Augustine, the sentencer should love the offender
but hate the offense, the law of punishment concerns only the latter
of these obligations. Or so it would appear. The human reality of
punishment decision is that the two obligations are closely related.
Translating moral duties into emotional terms is not a mere ex-
change of words; it also involves confronting the way moral and
nonmoral factors intertwine in real-life judgments of desert.
Within the framework of retributive punishment, the agapic ob-
ligation is narrowly defined. In the official (i.e. nonpersonal) con-
text of a punishment decision the sentencer's obligation is to care
about (love the good, hate the bad in) the offender's choice to of-
fend and to evaluate the choice as conscientiously as possible. In-
stead of valuing what the offender might become, the valuing is of
what the offender was. It means denouncing the evil in the of-
fender's choice and caring for the good that was in the offender,
even if it was good overwhelmed by evil. I refer to this obligation as
moral caring in order to distinguish it from the broader, first-order
principle of agape.
Moral caring means caring for the good in an offender rather
108 I do not seek to prove the validity of agape as a first principle just as I do not seek
to prove the validity of respect for persons. Rather, I employ agapic obligations as emo-
tive analogues to respect for persons and retribution in an effort to translate rationalistic
concepts into emotive terms. Although I believe my argument to be faithful to the fun-
damental tenets of agape, the overall validity of the argument does not rest on that
basis; it stands or falls on the faithfulness of the translation of rationalistic concepts into
the emotive.
109 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD bk. XIV pt. 6 (M. Dods trans. 1950).
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than caring for the good of him. It means caring for the way in
which the offender has exercised his moral capacities in the past,
rather than how he might become a more moral person in the fu-
ture. Within a retributive framework, moral caring means caring
about the past exercise of moral choice; it ignores the offender's
potential future choices. If we cared only for the good of the of-
fender, then our caring would prevent imposing punishment in
many instances where it was deserved.
3. Moral Outrage
In the context of punishment, which focuses on responsible acts
of disrespect for others, moral caring means being angry at culpable
acts of disrespect. I will refer to this emotion as moral outrage.110
Moral outrage represents caring for the morality of persons by de-
nouncing their demonstrated evil-their responsible disrespect for
others."' We should feel angered by the deliberate choice of an
offender to commit an act of severe disrespect. Such a feeling dem-
onstrates our commitment to preserving moral order and to society
which promotes respect and regard for others. 112
If our outrage is to be moral, however, it must be morally
bounded. The first order principles of respect for persons and
agape dictate that all persons, including the worst offenders, have
the capacity for good as well as evil. Offenders are necessarily moral
persons, as much as they may have acted like animals. Regardless of
the degree of their evil, the obligation to recognize some value in
them remains. We may not deem any offender a nonperson. In the
context of punishment, moral caring sanctions anger at the of-
fender, but only in proportion to the offender's responsible act of
disrespect. The effort to ensure that anger remains proportionate
and therefore morally justified is the most important and difficult
aspect of a moral-emotive approach to retributive punishment.
110 I am not entirely comfortable with the phrase "moral outrage" because the word
"outrage" connotes a passion which knows few bounds and therefore goes beyond any
moral justification. See infra Section III(C)(3). Nevertheless, the phrase describes most
accurately the emotive but morally-restricted concept I wish to convey. While our lan-
guage has a number of words to describe feeling for the good of others (e.g., sympathy,
compassion, charity, benevolence, and empathy), we have no words for the feeling asso-
ciated with judging others' evil. Perjorative terms, such as revenge, vengeance, retalia-
tion, and reprisal, are the only words with an emotive flavor which involve the punitive
impulse. There are, of course, rationalistic terms such as just desert and retribution, but
these words fail to capture the emotive nature of the concept.
1 I SeeJ. FLETCHER, supra note 104. But see Wertheimer, Understanding Retribution, in 2
CRIMINALJUSTICE ETHICS 19, 33-37 (1983) (questioning whether the retributive motiva-
tion for punishment is consistent with the principles of either love or respect for others).
112 See W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 153-55 (1979).
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B. Problems in Application-Making Outrage Moral
The concept of moral outrage is not one of easy, practical appli-
cation. To tell decisionmakers confronted by a horrific deed that
they may be angry at its perpetrator, but not too angry, will tell
them nothing of any practical use. Worse, by giving moral authori-
zation to anger, we unleash the strongest of all emotions in punish-
ment decisions and the one least susceptible to control. Anger's
volatility makes it the most dangerous of emotions in criminal law.
The greatest risk in the moral-emotive approach is that
sentencers will confuse moral outrage with its amoral emotive
cousin, the passion of vengeance. 1 3 On a conceptual level we may
distinguish the two on the basis of the cognitive assessments under-
lying each; the distinction, in other words, between retribution and
revenge. Retribution involves a judgment of wrong to the society
according to publicly agreed principles of morality. 114 Retribution
seeks another's suffering, not to satisfy a personal need, but for a
principle of good-enforcing respect for persons.' 15 The suffering
it seeks to inflict is likewise limited by notions of public morality. By
contrast, revenge arises from a judgment of harm to self made ac-
cording to personal principles. One may seek to avenge oneself for
an accidental slight to one's honor as much as for a deliberate crime.
Even if the revenge sought is ostensibly for another's loss, the re-
venge-seeker is driven by a personalized vision of victimization: if
you hurt my friend, you hurt me. Vengeance seeks personal gain in
the form of restored dignity or power from another's suffering. 116
Overall, retribution and revenge bear the same relation to each
other as do agape and eros. Retribution and agape describe motiva-
tions based on publicly declared moral principles. Eros and revenge
describe nonmoral personal motivations for action.
The problem comes when we attempt to translate these theo-
retical distinctions into easily comprehensible, emotional terms.
Consider again the librarian murders. In the case of the nonresi-
dent offender, moral outrage would not permit the sentencing ju-
113 The confusion of these two has been responsible for much criticism of retribu-
tion, see supra text accompanying note 40, and for what has been called a "revenge
taboo," a condemnation of any practice which hints of the emotions of revenge. See S.
JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE 1-13 (1983).
114 Other distinctions include the following: revenge, unlike retribution, can be for
a harm other than a wrong; and revenge knows no principled bounds in the extent of
suffering it inflicts, where retribution is bound by principles of proportionality. See R.
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366-67 (1981).
115 See generally Moore, supra note 5; see also 41 T. ACQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 2a,
question 108 (T. O'Brien trans. 1971). That is, according to retributive principles. Cf
Wertheimer, supra note I 1l, at 35.
116 Id. at 34-35; see also Hunt, Punishment, Revenge and the Minimal Functions of the State,
in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN EMOTIONS, supra note 63, at 83-86.
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rors to vent their special horror of and anger at crimes by
nonresidents because these emotions are based on an assessment of
personal violation irrelevant to the offender's desert. As community
members, the jurors felt a loss of personal integrity and a concomi-
tant need to avenge that loss which was entirely apart from the de-
mands of retribution. But how are we to communicate this idea to
them? If we tell jurors that they may be outraged by the offender's
wrong can we really expect them to limit themselves, emotionally, to
the extent of the offender's responsibility? Something more is re-
quired for the moral regulation of anger. In order to determine
what that something is we need to know more about the temptation
to render punishment decisions on an amoral, emotional basis.
The greatest temptation in assessing what punishment is de-
served is to oversimplify-to exaggerate the good, or, more com-
monly, to exaggerate the evil of the offender. Culpability is morally
complex. To say how much a person is responsible for the harm he
or she has caused can be very difficult, especially if one is conscien-
tious in evaluating possible limitations on personal responsibility. It
is a daunting task both in terms of factual and moral evaluation.
The option of judging crudely, ignoring ambiguities, becomes in-
creasingly attractive.
Emotional reactions heighten the urge to oversimplify. Emo-
tions, as mythological structures, have a symbolic purpose. They
transform complex reality into something simpler and more readily
meaningful to the observer. They are like dramatic works, designed
to make persons and events appear larger, and simpler, then life. If
their mythologic functions go unchecked, the offender becomes a
cardboard character in a B movie, a caricature instead of a character,
a symbol instead of a person.
In many instances, the sentencer's personal situation deter-
mines the direction of the amoral emotive temptation. Whether the
sentencer is inclined for or against the offender depends on how the
offender fits into the sentencer's preexisting emotional mythology.
If the decisionmaker, because of her own business background, be-
lieves that people in business are generally upstanding and right-
eous, she will be inclined to see the businessman offender as
upstanding and righteous.
Those who speak for an offender at time of sentencing often
provide a dramatic example of the same dynamic. Relatives of an
offender often plead for mercy on the offender's behalf, while deny-
ing the evil of which the offender stands convicted. They cannot
admit the offender's commission of evil, because it that would make
the offender a Criminal and within the pleader's mythology he is a
cared-for Husband or Son. To accept the criminal reality would de-
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stroy the myth, an event with painful and far-reaching
consequences.
In the case of a serious crime, the decisionmaker's amoral emo-
tive temptation is normally the opposite-to condemn beyond what
is deserved. When called upon to judge a stranger who is responsi-
ble, to some extent, for a serious harm, the decisionmaker's tempta-
tion is to ignore moral complexities and declare the person and his
act entirely evil. The decisionmaker labels the offender a Criminal,
remaining indifferent to the person (he being capable of both good
and evil) behind that label." 7 In this way, the offender is designated
as "other." The more we can designate a person as fundamentally
different from ourselves, the fewer moral doubts we have about con-
demning and hurting that person."18 We assign the offender the
mythic role of Monster, a move which justifies harsh treatment and
insulates us from moral concerns about the suffering we inflict. The
offender guilty of a terrible offense, such as brutal, fatal abuse of his
children, inspires rage at his terrible deed. The magnitude of the
harm and the apparent evil necessary to accomplish it create the
temptation to look no further, to declare the offender as monstrous
as was his act, without conscientiously examining culpability. The
idea that the offender might have some moral excuse, however
small, is too painful to contemplate.
In our private lives, the fact that we otherwise value those we
judge checks the temptation to exaggerate their wrongdoing. The
people who hurt us are often friends, relatives, colleagues-individ-
uals whose good points we acknowledge and value. Our judgment
of them takes place within a context of caring. This emotional re-
straint appears less frequently in criminal punishment decisions,
where offenders are normally strangers to the sentencer, made more
strange by social, economic, racial or other group differences.
Differences in group membership between punisher and pun-
ished increase the risk of nonmoral judgment. Morally identical of-
fenders are likely to receive different punishments based upon
nonmoral group membership distinctions. In the case of the libra-
rian murders, the two juries rendered different sentences because of
an amoral emotional predisposition, what I call the otherness temp-
tation. This is the inclination to feel warmly towards those who ap-
117 In this way, empathy expresses the active caring of agape, the opposite of which
is not hate, but indifference. SeeJ. FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 63; R. ROBERTS, SPIRITU-
ALrrY AND HUMAN EMOTION 109-11 (1982).
118 E.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1584-92 (1987);
Sapontzis, A Critique of Personhood, 91 ETHICS 607, 613 (1981); H. WEIHOFEN, supra note
40, at 144-45. Many commentators have recognized this problem in the death penalty
context. Radin, supra note 6, at 1182 n.124; Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 34, at 129;
Weisberg, supra note 26, at 361, 391.
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pear similar to the decisionmaker, and hostile to those who appear
different. In the case of the librarian murders the otherness trait
was community residence. A similar temptation causes whites to
judge crimes committed by blacks against whites more harshly than
if they were committed by blacks against blacks.1 19 In our legal sys-
tem, decisionmakers and offenders often come from different social
backgrounds, making the offenders strangers to the sentencer. This
makes the otherness temptation particularly dangerous.
In some instances, the otherness temptation may operate in the
offender's favor. In cases where the offender and decisionmaker
share important social or personal similarities but the victim is ap-
parently "other," the decisionmaker will be tempted to disregard
the seriousness of the crime. In such cases, emotive support should
be lent to moral outrage.
Emotional reactions to crime provide tentative approaches to
punishment. They also constitute motivations that influence the
punishment decision. A sentencer's emotional reaction provides a
picture of the crime which the sentencer must then articulate and
justify. Thus anger may be seen as a prosecutor, dedicated to the
exposure and condemnation of evil. We see harm done to an inno-
cent person, become angry, and then seek a person or persons to
blame. Anger fuels the search for culpability and predisposes us to
culpable as opposed to nonculpable explanations.
Just as we may not rely solely on the advocacy of prosecutors to
produce just determinations of guilt or innocence, so we should not
rely solely on anger to resolve the question of deserved punishment.
Just as we need defense counsel to expose the errors of the prosecu-
tion in liability determination, so we need an internal, emotional op-
ponent to anger to ensure the morality of penal decisionmaking.
The general emotion which motivates a nonculpable view of the of-
fender is sympathy. We need to define a kind of sympathy, which
focuses on the relevant moral issues, to serve as our internal defense
counsel. Empathy will serve this function.
C. The Empathy Obligation
As part of evaluating the offender's offense the decisionmaker
should try to empathize with the offender, that is, care for the good
in his character. Because the focus of the sentencing decision is the
offender's choice to offend, the object of caring is the offender's
moral character at the time of that choice. Instead of anger's pre-
119 See infra Section IV(C). There is also evidence that American juries generally find
black defendants unsympathetic, and that whether or not the defendant appears sympa-
thetic to the jury is an important factor in jury decision. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 194-218 (1966).
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sumption of evil, empathy's presumption is of good, that is, of a
capacity for and desire to act with respect for others. Empathy val-
ues and seeks to find the good in the offender's character.' 20 Thus
the sentencer should be informed of the obligation to care about the
offender as a morally worthy creature and should be given the op-
portunity to hear about his good deeds, his capacity for and desire
to do good. Together these requirements constitute what I will call
the empathy obligation.
Empathy leads to moral understanding by revealing another
person's moral perspective.12 Yet empathy is more than imagining
another's moral situation from that person's perspective: it is caring
about that moral situation. A sadist imagines his victim's suffering
but has no respect or love for the sufferer. 122 Empathy expresses
the active caring of agape, the opposite of which is not hate, but
indifference.' 23 If a decisionmaker feels empathy for the offender,
the decisionmaker will care about potential limitations on culpabil-
ity. Empathy does not preclude a judgment of culpability, however.
Aimed at moral understanding, empathy does not require or imply
forgiveness. It simply strips away nonmoral reasons for blame.
Although the determination of deserved punishment focuses
upon the offender's evil choice, it necessarily implicates the positive
moral qualities of the offender. Empathy directs the evaluation of
positive morality, thus setting the context for a final judgment of
desert. As previously discussed, deserved punishment comprises
two components, motive-intentionality and autonomy. Motive-in-
tentionality examines the nature and extent of the offender's desire
to do evil. But a decisionmaker can only accurately assess motive-
intentionality in the context of the offender's desire to do good.
Consider the case of the father convicted of his child's deliberate
murder, through a pattern of physical abuse. The nature and source
of the desire to harm are illuminated not only by the acts of abuse,
but also by acts of love for the child. If the offender never demon-
120 For other, similar views of empathy applied to the law, see Henderson, supra note
118 and Black, The Human Imagination in the Great Society, in THE HUMAN IMAGINATION 4-6
(1986). For a similar definition under the designation of sympathy, see P. MERCER, SYM-
PATHY AND ETHICS 4-19, 82-134 (1972). See generally Blum, Compassion, in EXPLAINING
EMOTION, supra note 54, at 507-16. Cf L. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 157-60 (1986).
121 See Henderson, supra note 118, at 1576-79, 1650-52; Moore, supra note 5, at 41;
P. MERCER, supra note 120, at 118-30; M. SCHELER, THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY 49 (P.
Heath trans. 1954). For interesting applications of similar principles to medical diagno-
sis and health care, see Margolis, The Relevance of Emotions for Medicine, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN EMOTION, supra note 63, at 56-64 (diagnosis) and Ardal, Of Sympathetic Imagina-
tion, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN EMOTION, supra note 63, at 65-71 (health care).
122 See, e.g., M. SCHELER, supra note 121, at 5; P. MERCER, supra note 120, at 82-116;
Williams, Styles of Ethical Theory, in ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 91 (1983). Cf
M. JAGGER & K. RICHARD, "SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL."
123 SeeJ. FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 63.
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strated any love for the child, but showed pleasure in its pain then
the inference is strong that the crime represented an evil of the most
awful sort-a decision to take joy in another's suffering. Such a
crime deserves a place at the top of our culpability hierarchy. If the
offender was a loving father in many instances, however, then the
choice to offend appears less devilish and more tragic.
Autonomy relates to the offender's ability to choose between
right and wrong, good and evil. Autonomy evaluates the offender's
moral struggle-the extent to which forces beyond the offender's
own desires impelled the choice to offend. Empathy supplies the
motivation to take autonomy limitations seriously. In the case of the
child-killer, an empathic approach seeks evidence that the offender's
ability to choose may have been diminished. If the offender was
himself abused as a child, and we know that such victims tend to
become abusers themselves, that knowledge gives us a needed per-
spective on autonomy. Within the autonomy continuum this per-
spective suggests that the homicide was less the result of a free-
willed desire to do evil and more a choice compelled by forces ema-
nating from outside the offender. As was the case with motive-in-
tentionality, the offender, from this perspective, is less a figure of
evil and more a person for whom we may feel emotionally, more a
person who has moral worth despite his horrible crime.
As an emotive experience, empathy itself cannot be required.
Although there are ways to prompt emotional reactions through
manipulation (hence the description of a movie or book as a "tear-
jerker"), no rule can mandate feelings. We can require that deci-
sionmakers follow certain rational principles, but we cannot force
them to alter their subjective world view.' 24 Even if we could man-
date emotions, the principle of respecting persons' choice-making
abilities would preclude the attempt. The most we can require of
decisionmakers is that they make an empathic effort. Even an un-
successful effort may provide moral insight, by revealing an alterna-
tive perspective which would otherwise be ignored. 125
1. Empathy and Sympathy
Ideally, we should distinguish empathy from caring for others
based on considerations not relevant to moral assessment. Often
we sympathize with others not because we care about them or their
situation as a matter of morality, but because something about their
situation reminds us of our own. Mothers sympathize with other
mothers, or lawyers with other lawyers, because of self-love, not
124 W. LYONS, supra note 55, at 181; Williams, Deciding to Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE
SELF (1973).
125 See generally supra Section I(B).
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moral caring. Empathy, by contrast, promotes feeling for another as
good in itself, not because it makes the empathizer feel good.
Empathy as it has been defined here is not an everyday emo-
tion. We cannot point to a common emotional situation and defini-
tively state: "there it is." That is because, in practice the emotions
of empathy and sympathy based on personal identification are often
inextricably intertwined. It may be that the best we can do is to
encourage caring and then seek to turn that caring to moral pur-
poses. A return to the librarian murders will illustrate. The second
jury, the one deciding the fate of the resident-offender, saw the of-
fender as a member of their community and so cared about him.
This reaction appears to have been a matter of self-love, not moral
valuing under respect of agapic principles. But the practical effect
was similar to that of empathy. Because jurors sympathized with the
offender, they regarded him as person of value and took seriously
the mitigating evidence he presented.
26
There can be no definitive determination that the decision of
the jury in the second librarian murder case was correct while the
first was not. The juries considered the same evidence in both
cases. In both cases nonmoral influences involving the personal sit-
uations of the jurors and the offender played a role. Nevertheless
we must decide which of these basic approaches we prefer. In this
context, the law's ideal of an impersonal, dispassionate deci-
sionmaker must be a dangerous illusion.
To insist that sentencers have no personal (as opposed to
agapic) feelings about the punishment issue, would come close to
prohibiting the decision itself. Virtually all decisionmakers bring
some personal, emotional perspective to their decision. If we ig-
nore this fact, but promote the impersonal approach through the
myth of dispassion, we ignore the real problem of emotive influ-
ence. We condone nonmoral results, such as the disparate out-
comes of the librarian murder cases, as long as the decisionmakers
are not obviously biased.
Given that we must choose between imperfect methods of deci-
sionmaking, the example of the second jury comes closer to the
ideal of moral caring than does the first. The second set of jurors
began with a sense that the offender had value; that valuing made
them struggle with the extent of culpability. It provided an emo-
tional anchor for their proportionality determination. The first jury
126 Although beyond the scope of this Article to consider, philosopher Ronald De
Sousa presents an intriguing argument for expanding the ethical view of emotions to
include self-related emotions. He argues that these have moral content in that they are
important to human thriving and that relations of the self to others provide the basis for
ethical principles of general application. DE SOUSA, supra note 58, at 308-14.
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arguably cut short its evaluation process as a result of nonmoral in-
fluence. It lacked the personal incentive to find mitigation which
characterized the second jury. As previously stated, we cannot de-
finitively state which of these decisions was right. In the capital con-
text, however, we can express a preference for a process where the
risk of error is borne more by the prosecution than by the defense.
That may be the strongest reason to use the second jury as our
model.
2. Empathy and Moral Outrage-The Emotional Dynamic of
Deserved Punishment
Because of the magnitude of the capital decision, its complex-
ity, and the degree of discretion enjoyed by sentencers, 127 sentenc-
ing decisions are likely to be emotional as well as rationalistic.
Emotions help sentencers "fill the gap" in their moral reasoning.128
Decisionmakers may rely less upon punishment theory than a prag-
matic weighing of conflicting emotional accounts of the offense.
The prosecution will tell a story designed to provoke anger; the de-
fense will respond with one to evoke sympathy. The sentencer must
choose between or among them. As the law now stands, this gives
the prosecution a significant advantage at the punishment stage.
The law's sanction of retribution, and the fact of criminal convic-
tion, give weight and legitimacy to the prosecution's angry appeal.
The defense needs a similar, legally authorized, emotional appeal to
check that anger, to keep the debate within moral bounds. The em-
pathy obligation fulfills this function. Empathy ensures due process
by requiring that all offenders, attractive or unattractive, be judged
according to the same desert scale. It is because we do not normally
care about all persons but only those who are like us that articulat-
ing the empathy obligation is critical.
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's classic statement on punishment
and revenge provides another way of seeing the dynamic of empathy
and moral outrage. Stephen wrote: "The criminal law stands to the
passion of revenge in the same relation as marriage to the sexual
appetite."'' 29 Few would argue that marriage is based entirely upon
sexual attraction, just as few would argue that marriage generally
works without it. The institution of marriage works by encouraging
certain expressions of sexual desire and restraining others. If we
redefine Stephen's "passion of revenge" as anger at wrongdoing,
we see it is a proper, and probably inherent, part of retributive pun-
ishment. Yet the morality of the penal decision depends on whether
127 See supra Section I.
128 See R. DE SOUSA, supra note 58, at 195.
129 J. STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863).
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anger is morally directed. The obligation to empathize helps ensure
that it is. As in the relation between marriage and sex, empathy reg-
ulates a basic human instinct so that it may be expressed, but only
within moral bounds.' 30
This formulation of desert may appear intellectually "soft." It
lacks the hard lines of rules or principles upon which both lawyers
and philosophers generally insist. The traditional view would blame
this on the emotive approach. Emotions are mushy, irrational influ-
ences which impede rational analysis. Speaking in terms of emo-
tions does not promote conceptual clarity. The intellectual
temptation is to declare the emotive approach incoherent and dan-
gerous. But what is the alternative? Is taking emotion seriously
worse then allowing decisionmaking based on a fiction of
dispassion?
Moreover, if the version of desert employed here appears
vague, we must ask whether that is because of its emotive terminol-
ogy, or because of the vagueness of the desert concept. Perhaps the
notion of a deserved punishment is itself a more intuitive, i.e., emo-
tional, prereflective, judgment than its proponents acknowledge. If




EMOTIONAL JUSTICE-THE CAPITAL CONTEXT
We turn finally to the task of applying moral-emotive principles
130 Although Stephen's statement may be interpreted consistently with the empathy
obligation, he probably would not have subscribed to that interpretation. His brother
and biographer wrote of Stephen: "His mode of passing sentence showed that his ha-
tred of brutality included the hatred of brutes. He did not affect to be reluctant to do his
duty. He did not explain that he was acting for the moral good of the prisoner or apolo-
gize for being himself an erring mortal. He showed rather-the stern satisfaction of a
man suppressing a noxious human reptile." L. STEPHEN, LIFE OF JAMES FrrzJAMES STE-
PHEN quoted in Golding, Criminal Sentencing: Some Philosophical Considerations, in JUSTICE
AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 103. See also 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 478 (analo-
gizing execution of criminals to extermination of dangerous animals such as wolves or
tigers) and vol. 2, at 81-82 (urging the hatred of criminals).
131 This sort of conviction is essential to our personal morality, although its applica-
tion to public morality is problematic. Bernard Williams writes:
[T]he intuitive condition is not only a state which private under-
standing can live with, but a state which it must have as part of its life, if
that life is going to have any density or conviction and succeed in being
that worthwhile kind of life which human beings lack unless they feel
more than they can say, and grasp more than they can explain.
Conflict of Values, in MORAL LUCK 82 (1981). Williams contrasts private understanding of
morality, which is generally comfortable with the idea of conflicting values and intuitive
resolutions, with public life, which requires a reasoned explication or moral decisions
and cannot easily accommodate the idea that moral values may irreconcilably conflict.
See also Donagan, supra note 82.
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to sentencing in capital cases. Before proceeding, I must offer an
important caution, however. In this Article I take no position for or
against the death penalty. The moral principles which justify and
define punishment must be brought to bear directly on that ques-
tion. 132 For purposes of this Article, I consider death as the law's
maximum punishment, similar to other punishments except for the
requirement of maximum accuracy in culpability evaluation. Death
is significantly more severe than any other punishment and is irre-
versible; for both reasons, accuracy is all-important. Otherwise,
although the emotive issues are more dramatic and the case law con-
cerning them richer in the capital context than elsewhere, the prob-
lem of emotive influence is essentially the same in any punishment
context which permits sentencer discretion.
A. The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty and the Empathy
Obligation
At the sentencing phase of a capital case prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys frequently do battle over the "otherness" of the of-
fender. Prosecutors seek to dehumanize defendants 33 while
defense attorneys attempt the reverse.1 34 Yet the battle itself is ille-
gitimate. The legal categories of aggravating and mitigating factors
do not concern the essential humanity of the offender. And any sen-
tence based on ajudgment that the offender is "other" must violate
the basic principle of human worth upon which retribution is based.
The litigation over otherness in capital cases illustrates the
point made at the outset-where the law permits sentencing discre-
tion, emotions are necessarily implicated and if they are not ad-
132 Likewise, I take no position on the question of whether the moral principles of
respect for persons or agape upon which I base my arguments support the death penalty
either in theory or as it is now practiced. I step around this concededly vital issue in
order to address problems of application which otherwise might not be examined. For
better or for worse, capital punishment is presently lawful and, barring major unfore-
seen political orjudicial upheavals, will remain so for the near future. Given that people
will be executed, I believe lawyers, particularly academic lawyers, have a responsibility to
consider not only the issue ofjustification but also the pragmatic issues of application.
Although I advocate a method of improving capital sentencing, I should not be taken as
endorsing the concept of capital punishment itself.
133 E.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 nn.11, 12 (1986) (prosecutor calls
defendant an "animal" who "shouldn't be let out of his cell unless he has a leash on him
and a prison guard at the other end of that leash."). See also United States v. Cook, 432
F.2d 1093, 1106-08 (7th Cir. 1970) (defendant termed "subhuman"), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 996 (1971); Elvaker v. State, 707 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (prose-
cutor refers to defendants as "creatures").
134 J. CARROLL & D. BALSKE, TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE 2, 8-9 (1984); Weisberg,
supra note 26, at 361; Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 321, 338 (1983); White, Juror Decisionmaking in the




dressed, can cause significant moral error. The Supreme Court has
in a number of decisions recognized different aspects of this prob-
lem, but has failed to develop a coherent method of addressing it. It
has recognized only part of the empathy obligation.
1. The Opportunity to Empathize
In order to care about another person, we need to know some-
thing positive about him or her. Even assessing deserved punish-
ment involves an evaluation of capacities for good as well as evil.1 35
The modem tradition of presenting a wide range of information
about offender and offense at sentencing has supported this kind of
evaluation. 136 In capital cases, the Court has constitutionalized the
sentencer's opportunity to consider offender's character. In a series
of decisions based on the "uniqueness of the individual," the
Supreme Court has tacitly approved part of the empathy obligation
by prohibiting most restrictions on mitigating evidence and barring
mandatory death penalties.
a. Global Mitigation
Regardless of a jurisdiction's capital punishment statute, the
Court has held that the sentencer must be allowed to consider all
''compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind" that the defendant may offer in support of
life.137 The Court has struck down death sentences where trial
courts either expressly or implicitly excluded from consideration a
defendant's upbringing'38 or his adjustment to life behind bars.13
9
The Court's decisions may be explained according to deterrent
or rehabilitative theories of punishment. The decisions are also
consistent with a broad view of retribution, however. Information
considering the offender's moral decisionmaking before and after
135 See supra text accompanying notes 120-31.
136 Although it has probably done so for rehabilitative and deterrent reasons more
than retributive. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949).
137 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion). See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976). In this respect, the statutory mitigating factors
are essentially irrelevant; even if the proposed mitigation evidence does not implicate a
statutory factor, it cannot be barred. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); see Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1773 (1987). Yet the Court has continued to hold
that mitigating evidence must be "relevant" and has allowed statutory schemes which
restrictively define mitigation. E.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988). Thus, although juries may hear a wide range of miti-
gating evidence, the Court has not made clear what the jury must be told concerning its
legal relevance. See Franklin, 108 S. Ct. at 2320.
138 Hitchcock, 481 U.S. 393; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
139 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S.
Ct. 2716, 2724-26 (1987).
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the offense sheds light on the moral decision that was the offense.
This approach to mitigation permits the defense to present evidence
supporting the moral worth of the offender. The jury is given a rea-
son to care about the offender and resist the temptation to condemn
without making a conscientious desert evaluation. In this way, the
Court has worked to guarantee a defendant's ability to appeal to
jury empathy, an important part of the empathy obligation.
b. Prohibition On Mandatory Sentences.
The Court has also protected the empathy obligation by
prohibiting mandatory death sentences. In part for reasons of fac-
tual and evaluative complexity reviewed earlier,1 40 the Court has de-
termined that no legislative scheme can accurately distinguish
offenders deserving death from those who do not. The Court has
struck down all mandatory schemes it has reviewed, finding them
"unduly harsh and unworkably rigid."' 4 1 Mandatory schemes cate-
gorize offenses in the abstract; they cannot evaluate the particular
offense committed by the offender. Thus, a mandatory death sen-
tence "treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferenti-
ated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of death."' 42
Mandatory sentences preclude empathy because they preclude indi-
vidual offender consideration.
The Court has invalidated mandatory penalties for narrow sub-
categories of first-degree murder such as a purposeful killing in
commission of an armed robbery,143 premeditated killing of a police
officer in the performance of his official duties 144 and mandatory
death for first-degree murder committed by a prisoner under sen-
tence of life imprisonment. 145 The Court has held that, regardless
of deterrent concerns which might support such penalties, "the fun-
damental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
requires that the defendant be able to present any relevant mitigat-
ing evidence that could justify a lesser sentence.' 46 The defendant
has a constitutional right to appeal to empathy.
140 See supra Section I(D)(1).
141 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion).
142 Id. at 304; accord, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
143 Roberts, 428 U.S. 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
144 Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
145 Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987).
146 Id. at 2727.
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2. The Obligation to Make an Empathic Effort-California v.
Brown
While the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the opportu-
nity for empathy, the empathy obligation requires more than mere
opportunity; the decisionmaker must make an affirmative effort to
empathize. Despite some gropings in this direction, the Court has
largely missed the importance of encouraging the empathic effort.
In California v. Brown 147 the Court demonstrated an understand-
ing of empathy's relevance, but showed little insight into the
problems of application. In Brown the trial court gave a capital sen-
tencing jury the standard antisympathy instruction used in guilt
phase proceedings. The trial court warned the jury that it "must not
be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, preju-
dice, public opinion or public feeling."'148 A four-justice plurality of
the Supreme Court held that the instruction did not violate the
eighth amendment because in context a reasonable jury would in-
terpret the instruction "as a directive to ignore only the sort of sym-
pathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced
during the penalty phase."' 149 Justice O'Connor, concurring, held
the instruction permissible because the sentence imposed "should
reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion."' 50
The plurality and Justice O'Connor were apparently concerned with
distinguishing nonmoral emotional bonds between sentencer and
offender, which should not affect the sentencing decision, from
those morally based feelings which are permissible.151
The Brown case turns on the problem of translating moral terms
into the emotive. The issue was not whether the instructions could
be reasonably interpreted in a way consistent with constitutional
principles; rather, the question was what the jurors probably under-
stood by those instructions. As the Brown dissenters pointed out,
the most likely interpretation of the instructions by the jury, in the
context of the case, bore little resemblance to the interpretation of
either the plurality or of Justice O'Connor.
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that they jury might well have
interpreted the instruction as prohibition against any emotional re-
147 479 U.S. 38 (1987).
148 Id. at 539. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) provides an interesting
contrast. The trial court told the sentencing jury in a discretionary capital punishment
situation, "in this part of the trial the law does not forbid you from being influenced by
pity for the defendants and you may be governed by mere sentiment and sympathy for
the defendants in arriving at a proper penalty in this case." Id. at 189.
149 Brown, 479 U.S. at 542.
150 Id. at 545.
151 See supra Section III.
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sponse to the evidence.1 52 He noted that the prosecutor cited the
instruction in his final argument as part of a general antisympathy
plea. The prosecutor argued that the defense mitigation evidence
"was a blatant attempt by the defense to inject personal feelings in
the case, to make the defendant appear human, to make you feel for
the defendant and .. .you ladies and gentlemen must steel your-
selves against those kinds of feelings in reaching a decision in this
case.153 The prosecutor's argument was designed to establish the
irrelevance of the mitigation evidence and to promote the myth of
dispassion. The prosecutor sought to prevent the jury from em-
pathizing with the defendant.
The Brown Court misunderstood the full dimension of the prob-
lem of emotional influence in death cases. 154 In a context where
juries have broad discretion in rendering a decision that is by nature
emotional, the law must address the jurors' emotions clearly and
directly. Instructions which seem to encourage the myth of dispas-
sion are especially dangerous because they discourage emotional
self-examination and therefore increase the chance of amoral emo-
tional influence. The courts have an obligation to minimize such
moral error by informing juries of their obligation to try to em-
pathize with the offender as part of assessing deserved punishment.
B. Proposals
Where jurors perform a major sentencing function in capital
cases, I propose the following jury instruction on moral-emotive
principles. This instruction would provide the basic means of trans-
lating moral-emotive principles into action. Moral-emotive princi-
ples should also inform other aspects of litigation, including jury
selection, admission of evidence at the sentencing phase and, of
course, arguments at sentencing.
1. Jury Instruction
Courts should instruct capital juries on moral outrage and em-
pathy as follows:
The sentencing decision which lies before you is one of the
most important you will ever make. Although you should ap-
152 Brown, 479 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 553 (quoting from the record, Brennan, J., dissenting).
154 The Court similarly missed or chose to ignore a violation of the empathy princi-
ple inJohnson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 35 (1987) (Marshall,J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The trial court had instructed jurors at the penalty phase, "you should not
allow sympathy, sentiment or prejudice to affect you in reaching your decision. You
should avoid any influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor when im-
posing sentence." Id. at 36-37. The prosecutor, in closing argument, had disparaged
the import of defendant's mitigation evidence concerning his background.
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proach the decision rationally, your emotions-your feelings-will
necessarily be involved as well. You should not let your emotions
decide the case but rather should use your emotions to help you
decide.
The crime of which [name of the defendant] stands convicted
is one of great evil, and to the extent you feel anger at the wrongs
to others for which the defendant is legally responsible, there is
nothing wrong with feeling such anger. But anger can overwhelm
properjudgment. To ensure that it does not, I suggest you try to
care for the good in [name of the defendant].
As a human being [name of defendant] is a person who has
done some good as well as bad and is capable of good as well as
bad. Set aside your feelings about the crime for a moment and
consider the defendant as you might a neighbor, a colleague at
work, or a social acquaintance, someone that you know and care
about. Consider the extent to which [name of the defendant] has
done and is capable of doing good. Then reconsider what [name
of the defendant] did in this case.
If, while keeping in mind all that is positive about [name of
the defendant] you determine that [he or she] deserves the maxi-
mum penalty, then, and only then, should you vote to impose it.
In cases where the jurors and the defendant come from differ-
ent social groups, the following instruction should be included:
When judging people, we all tend to be more sympathetic
who are like us. This is a particular problem in our society which
is made up of so many different groups. You have a responsibility
to care about [name of the defendant] to the same extent as if [he
or she] were like someone you know. Only if you can do that, can
you fairly decide what punishment [he or she] deserves.
In those cases where the situations of the victim and the deci-
sionmaker make it appropriate, an additional section on caring for
the victim should be added along the following lines.
Some of what you have heard about the character of the vic-
tim in this case may lead you to view the offense as less serious
than you might otherwise. Perhaps you might regard the offense
more seriously if the victim were someone more like yourself or
someone you know. You should remember that every human be-
ing has a basic worth and no one deserves to be killed without
justification. In judging the seriousness of the offense imagine
that the victim in this case was someone you might know-a col-
league, a neighbor or the like-who acted as did the victim in this
case and suffered a similar fate.
2. Judges and the Empathy Obligation
The obligation to make an empathic effort is at least as impor-
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tant for a sentencing judge as it is for a jury. By virtue of position
and experience, judges are probably less likely to react to the of-
fender as a fellow human being and more likely to find maximum
culpability than are jurors. 155 More than any other sort of lawyer,
judges have promoted the myth of dispassion. The myth provides
judges with tangible benefits; justice as dispassion allows judges to
depersonalize (apparently) what would otherwise be painful per-
sonal decisions. Judges personify and gain prestige from the ideal
of dispassionate justice. To persuade them that they are inevitably
creatures of emotion and that they must take some special measures
to deal with their emotions in certain cases, will be difficult.
a. Judicial Training and Legal Culture
Judicial education in the inevitability of emotion and the moral-
ity of empathy may serve as the first step in our moral-emotive en-
deavor. As part of their professional training judges should learn to
recognize and confront their own emotional natures, so that they
may better understand their own penal intuitions. Such education
cannot succeed in a cultural vacuum, however. To be effective, this
educational approach should occur as part of a general reexamina-
tion of dispassion in the law. Scholars, and others concerned with
the broad shape of the law, must explore the complex relation be-
tween emotional reactions and legal policy in many different areas
of the law. A general reconsideration of law and emotion will better
define the limits of rationalistic rules and permit improved moral
decisionmaking where rule regulation is difficult. The effort, if suc-
cessful, will subtly alter the culture of law so that Emotion is no
longer viewed as Evil, but a broad category of reactions whose na-
tures and origins we must distinguish. 56
This describes a rather grandiose and long-term project. In the
short run, even if moral-emotive principles win legal recognition,
most judges will view them with skepticism, at least as they apply to
judicial decisionmaking. Yet simple legal recognition will work its
own cultural changes. If officially recognized, emotions can be the
subject of direct legal argument. Lawyers will have the right to con-
front judges on the issue of emotional influence. Emotion will be-
come a legitimate topic of discussion in the courtroom. Although
only a first step, it is crucially important one.
155 In generaljurors are less likely to condemn offenders to death than are judges.
Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1409, 1413 (1985). Judges are also less representative of the community. Id. at
1425-26; Mello & Robson,Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life in
Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 47-48 (1985).
156 SeeJ. AVERILL, supra note 61, at 114-15.
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b. Rule Regulation-The Jury Override
As a general proposition, moral-emotive principles do not lend
themselves to strict rules for evaluating the correctness of decisions.
One exception is where a judge overrides a jury's recommendation
of a life sentence and imposes death. Here the law should translate
the empathy obligation into a strong presumption against over-
ride. 157 Where a judge overrides a jury's recommendation of life,
the empathy obligation requires that the judge explicitly credit, by
formal written opinion, all good in the offender. This is especially
important because that good may have persuaded the jury to vote
for life. If nonstatutory mitigation was presented to the jury, the
sentencing judge must consider this as well. The judge must
demonstrate that he or she understands the inclinations which
prompted the jury to recommend life and must, in a morally princi-
pled way, explain why the jury was wrong.
In reviewing jury overrides, the Supreme Court has paid lip ser-
vice to the idea of additional scrutiny but, in its holdings, has re-
sorted to law's usual deference to discretionary decisions by judicial
officers. Instead of confronting the special institutional pressures
on judges not to empathize, the Court has upheld overturned jury
recommendations by means of two strategies for avoiding examina-
tion of the decisional merits: 1) that state appellate courts have al-
ready performed the strict scrutiny necessary; and 2) that a decision
in conformance with sentencing guidelines is unimpeachable. 158
An examination of the first proposition lies beyond the scope of this
Article. 159 As to the second, sentencing guidelines are clearly inade-
quate to ensure just results. 160 By treating the guidelines as virtual
guarantors of ajust result the Court has elevated the myth of dispas-
sion to dangerous heights.
157 This is aside from any arguments about the justification for the practice of al-
lowing jury overrides.
158 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (no constitutional violation injury
override); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (no constitutional violation where
judge overrode jury recommendation and in so doing misapplied in part state law on
aggravating and mitigating factors); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (trial
court overrides 10-2 jury recommendation for life).
159 For critical views of one state's experience, see Radelet, supra note 155; Mello &
Robson, supra note 155. The Florida Supreme Court has justified jury overrides in part
by the argument that judges are less susceptible to emotional influence than juries.
Porter v. State, 429 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); State v.
Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). This Article has
raised a number of questions about the moral presuppositions of such an argument.
160 See supra Section I(C); Mello & Robson, supra note 155, at 60-62.
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C. McClesky v. Kemp-Empathy, Race and the Limits of Moral-
Emotive Guidance
The Supreme Court's recent decision in McClesky v. Kemp 161
serves as a fitting recapitulation of many of the themes of this Arti-
cle. The case illustrates the amoral emotive temptations to which
discretionary sentencers are prone; it demonstrates the Court's
commitment, nevertheless, to discretionary capital sentencing and
underscores the need for moral-emotive guidance in that context.
Finally, the case should stand as a caution that moral-emotive gui-
dance, while important in encouraging moral decisionmaking, has
severe limitations as a means of ensuring moral results.
1. Race and Otherness
The most dangerous otherness problem for a heterogeneous
society is otherness based on group affiliation. Whenever a member
of a group that is commonly designated as "other" by the majority
population commits a crime, the majority psychologically attributes
the crime to the other group. The crime becomes more frightening
because committed by "another" and harsh punishment appears
more warranted. This was the cause of the disparity in sentences in
the hypothetical librarian murders. In a society such as ours, where
race is an obvious and deeply-rooted source of social differences,
race presents the most serious otherness problem. McClesky v. Kemp
supplies an all too familiar illustration.
McClesky, a black man convicted and sentenced to die n Geor-
gia for the murder of a white policeman, challenged his death sen-
tence on grounds of racial discrimination. He presented statistical
evidence showing that in Georgia, blacks convicted of killing white
victims were 22 time more likely to receive the death penalty than if
their victims were black.162 The statistical evidence also demon-
strated that whites who killed whites were significantly more likely to
receive the ultimate penalty than blacks convicted of killing
blacks. 163 The strong inference from the statistics was that Georgia
juries found white lives more valuable than black and were most
frightened or incensed by cross-racial killings where blacks killed
whites. Although the majority noted the trial court's criticisms of
defendant's statistical studies, 64 the majority did not deny that Mc-
Clesky had presented disturbing evidence of systemic racial bias. 165
161 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
162 Id. at 1785 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1763-64 (Powell,J., majority opinion).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1764-65 n.6.
165 One scholar has argued that the most disturbing aspect of this statistical showing
is not discrimination against black defendants, but discrimination against black victims,
1989]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
McClesky's statistics demonstrated a familiar psychological ten-
dency: that predominantly white decisionmakers tend to sympathize
more with whites than blacks. 166 Whites recognize other whites as
part of the commonality; they regard blacks as other.
2. The Discretion Dilemma
In McClesky the Court again faced the discretion dilemma: dis-
cretion is necessary to justice because rigid rules cannot capture the
moral complexities of individual cases, yet discretion makes deci-
sionmaking vulnerable to amoral, here racial, influence. The Court
felt it had to choose between two evils: too-rigid rules or too-broad
discretion. The Court chose the latter.
By a five to four margin, the Court found that mere statistical
disparity is insufficient to challenge a system based upon discretion,
because as long as discretion is permitted, statistical disparities are
inevitable. 67 Accepting the defendant's claim, the Court argued,
would devastate death penalty prosecutions and might lead to the
abolition of discretion in a wide variety of legal contexts. 168 The
Court assumed this would constitute a cure worse than the dis-
ease. 169  Having rejected the systemic challenge McClesky
presented, the Court denied his appeal, finding that he had failed to
demonstrate prejudice affecting his particular sentence. 170
In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the statistics presented
by McClesky showed race was a significant criterion for sentencers
and argued: "[c]onsidering the race of a defendant or victim in de-
ciding if the death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds
with [the] concern that an individual be evaluated as a unique
human being."' 171 Such moral error should not be permitted, re-
gardless of the consequences of its elimination, Brennan argued. 172
The Court's treatment of racial bias in other criminal contexts
underlines the consequentialist nature of the McClesky decision.
Where the sought-for remedy does not threaten the basic legal
structure, the Court has taken the problem more seriously. The
whose victimization is, in a relative sense, minimized by a criminal justice system which
does not treat them as seriously as if the victims were white. Carter, When Victims Happen
to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 439-47 (1988).
166 Here, juror sympathy operates most strongly with regard to the race of the vic-
tim, rather than the race of the defendant. See Dane & Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants'
and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 104-
06 (1982).
167 McClesky, 107 S. Ct. at 1777-81; see also id. at 1769-70.
168 Id. at 1779-81.
169 Id. at 1767-69. See Burt, supra note 33, at 1794-98.
170 McClesky, 107 S. Ct. at 1766-67, 1777-79.
171 Id. at 1790.
172 Id. at 1791-94.
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Court has required careful scrutiny for racial bias in the selection of
grand jurors173 and held that the right to a fair trial includes a right
to a fair cross-section of the community in the prospective jury
pool. 174 This requires representation of all distinctive groups
within the jurisdiction's population, including blacks and women.175
The Court has held that in capital trials of interracial crimes, de-
fendants must have the opportunity to question jurors on racial atti-
tudes. 176 And in all cases, in the selection of a jury the prosecution
may not exercise its peremptory challenges on a racial basis.
177
3. The Limits of Moral-Emotive Guidance
I have argued that where the usual stuff of law-rules distin-
guishing situations based on objective criteria-is too crude a means
of regulation, decisions are likely to be emotional. In such cases,
decisionmakers should receive moral-emotive guidance, particularly
in the form of the empathy obligation. This means that, given a
commitment to retaining capital punishment, the best means of
eliminating racial bias in capital sentencing would be to give the em-
pathy obligation the force of law. I believe this proposition to be
true, but that should not obscure the larger truth that in terms of
ensuring just results, moral-emotive guidance has severe limitations.
Moral-emotive guidance assists decisionmakers with their own
decision processes; it provides few means for after-the-fact evalua-
tion of their decisions. We can tell whites not to regard blacks as
"other" but in individual instances of the exercise of discretion we
cannot tell whether they have followed that advice. Given our na-
tion's history, it would be naive to suppose that a few well-chosen
words of advice will solve the problem. Where we rely primarily on
moral-emotive guidance, we rely primarily on the moral character of
the sentencer.
All of which leads to two basic points about capital punishment.
First, given that the American people and their courts have demon-
strated a commitment to capital punishment and that discretion is
required for accurate assessment of whether death is deserved,
moral-emotive guidance is necessary and should prove helpful in
minimizing moral error from emotional influences. Second, the
provision of moral-emotive guidance will not ensure that sentences
will be just. Instead, it represents a frank acknowledgement that the
173 E.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977).
174 E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879).
175 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527-28, 531-38.
176 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
177 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1989] 709
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
choice of life or death is essentially entrusted to the moraljudgment
of a few.
CONCLUSION
Like most fields of thought, the law has developed its own vo-
cabulary for expressing concepts and promoting values. The lan-
guage of law is the language of rationality, of the cool and the
deliberative. While this insistence upon rationalistic expression has
general merit in the elucidation of critical issues, in some instances
it obscures more than it reveals. Where, as in criminal punishment,
the influence of emotions is too fundamental to ignore or entirely
condemn, the law's vocabulary requires expansion to permit emo-
tive discourse.
Bringing emotions into legal discourse has its risk. We must
take care that decisionmakers' personal, nonmoral inclinations do
not substitute for legal principles in the resolution of controversies.
Thus, where we can devise rules sufficiently determinate to mini-
mize emotional influence, we should do so. When we reach the lim-
its of law, when we enter those areas where rules lose their power to
direct us toward just results, however, recognition of and struggle
with emotional influence becomes necessary. In these mysterious
places we need to reconcile thoughts and feelings.
In the seventeenth century Blaise Pascal wrote in his Pensees:
"La coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connait [pas.]" 178 The
heart has its reasons, which reason knows not. In our everyday lives
we know what is right not only because we think it, but because we
feel it. It is our challenge as lawyers to make the law see the sense of
that insight.
178 B. PASCAL, PENSEES 343 (H.F. Stewart ed. 1950). Pascal also wrote: "Two ex-
cesses: to exclude reason, to admit nothing but reason." PENSEES 85, 183 (A. Krail-
sheimer trans. 1966).
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